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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a stochastic Nash game in which each player minimizes a parameterized expectation-
valued convex objective function. In deterministic regimes, proximal best-response (BR) schemes have been
shown to be convergent under a suitable spectral property associated with the proximal BR map. However,
a direct application of this scheme to stochastic settings requires obtaining exact solutions to stochastic opti-
mization problems at each iteration. Instead, we propose an inexact generalization of this scheme in which
an inexact solution to the BR problem is computed in an expected-value sense via a stochastic approximation
(SA) scheme. On the basis of this framework, we present three inexact BR schemes: (i) First, we propose a
synchronous inexact BR scheme where all players simultaneously update their strategies; (ii) Second, we ex-
tend this to a randomized setting where a subset of players is randomly chosen to update their strategies while
the other players keep their strategies invariant; (iii) Third, we propose an asynchronous scheme, where each
player chooses its update frequency while using outdated rival-specific data in updating its strategy. Under a
suitable contractive property on the proximal BR map, we proceed to derive a.s. convergence of the iterates
to the Nash equilibrium (NE) for (i) and (ii) and mean-convergence for (i)–(iii). In addition, we show that for
(i)–(iii), the generated iterates converge to the unique equilibrium in mean at a linear rate with a prescribed con-
stant rather than a sub-linear rate. Finally, we establish the overall iteration complexity of the scheme in terms
of projected stochastic gradient (SG) steps for computing an −Nash equilibrium and note that in all settings,
the iteration complexity is O(1/2(1+c)+δ) where c = 0 in the context of (i) and represents the positive cost
of randomization in (ii) and asynchronicity and delay in (iii). Notably, in the synchronous regime, we achieve
a near-optimal rate from the standpoint of solving stochastic convex optimization problems by SA schemes.
The schemes are further extended to settings where players solve two-stage stochastic Nash games with linear
and quadratic recourse. Finally, preliminary numerics developed on a multi-portfolio investment problem and a
two-stage capacity expansion game support the rate and complexity statements.
1 Introduction
Nash games represent an important subclass of noncooperative games [6, 23] and are rooted in the seminal work
by Nash in 1950 [33]. In the Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), there is a finite set of players, where each player
aims at minimizing its own payoff function over a player-specific strategy set, given the rivals’ strategies. Nash’s
eponymous solution concept requires that at an equilibrium, no player can improve its payoff by unilaterally de-
viating from its equilibrium strategy. Over the last several decades, there has been a surge of interest in utilizing
Nash games to model a range of problems in control theory and decision-making with applications in communica-
tion networks, signal processing, electricity markets, (cf. [5, 36, 55]). In recent years, stochastic Nash equilibrium
models have found particular relevance in power markets [17, 24, 26, 27, 39, 49]. Motivated by those applications,
we consider an N -player stochastic Nash game, where each player involves solving a stochastic constrained opti-
mization problem parameterized by the rivals’ strategies. We aim to analyze a breadth of distributed BR schemes
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sity, University Park, PA 16802, USA while Pang and Sen are with the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering at University
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for computing a Nash equilibrium in regimes complicated by uncertainty, delay, asynchronicity, and randomized
update rules.
Computation of Nash equilibria has been a compelling concern for the last several decades. As such game-
theoretic models have gained wider usage in networked regimes, the need for distributed algorithms has become
paramount. In particular, such algorithms require that the schemes respect the privacy concerns of users and are
implementable over networked regimes. For instance, in flow control and routing problems in communication
networks, gradient-based schemes have proved particularly useful [5, 25, 36, 55]. Such schemes generally impose
a suitable monotonicity property on the map to ensure global convergence of iterates. Gradient-based schemes are
characterized by ease of implementation and lower complexity in terms of each player step. Yet, such schemes are
not “fully rational” since selfish players may deviate the update schemes unless they are forced by some authority
to follow such gradient-based schemes. In BR schemes, players select their BR, given the current strategies of its
rivals’ (cf. [6, 22]). While there has been some effort to extend such schemes to engineered settings (cf. [47]), in
which the BR of each player can be expressed in a closed form. Proximal BR schemes appear to have been first
discussed by Facchinei and Pang in 2009 [19]. In subsequent work, asynchronous extensions to these proximal
schemes were applied to a class of optimization problems [46] while in [45], a framework that relied on solving
a sequence of NEPs was proposed to solve a class of monotone Nash games. In regimes with expectation-valued
payoffs, there has been far less computational research. Sampled and smoothed counterparts of the iterative reg-
ularization schemes presented in [25] were considered in [28] and [56]. However, much of this work considered
settings where the integrands of the expectation were differentiable, ruling out the incorporation of two-stage re-
course. Further, much of the past work in computing Nash equilibria has focused on risk-neutral problems with the
sole exception being [27], where gradient methods were combined with cutting-plane schemes. In recent work,
the last three authors have considered Nash games characterized by risk-aversion as well as two-stage recourse
and have examined a smoothing-based sampling scheme that is more aligned with sample average approximation
(SAA) techniques [37]. Yet, the question of computing a Nash equilibrium via natively distributed BR schemes in
stochastic regimes in settings complicated by delay, asynchronicity, and two-stage recourse remains a compelling
open question, motivating the current research.
Challenge and motivation: A natural question is why does it remain challenging to extend BR schemes to
stochastic regimes? When contending with Nash games where each player’s payoff function is expectation-valued,
computing a BR requires solving a stochastic optimization exactly or accurately. Unfortunately, unless this BR
problem is convex and the expectation as well as its gradients are available as closed-form expressions, extensions
of BR schemes to the stochastic regime remain impractical since the BR problem is essentially a stochastic op-
timization problem and requires Monte-Carlo sampling schemes [51]; in effect, this leads to a two-loop scheme
in which the upper loop represents the BR iterations while the lower loop captures the solution of the BR prob-
lem. Practical implementations of such schemes that provide asymptotically accurate solutions at each step remain
unavailable and at best, this avenue provides a rather coarse approximation of the equilibrium.
A single-loop approach: Instead, we consider developing single-loop inexact BR schemes that are practically
implementable; here the BR is computed inexactly in an expected-value sense but require that the inexactness
sequence be driven to zero. This is achieved by utilizing a SA scheme that utilizes an increasing number of pro-
jected SG steps. Note that in comparison with a two-loop scheme, in this setting, the “inside loop” requires a
known number of iterations, thereby making this scheme a single-loop scheme. While this is a relatively simple
scheme, the resulting convergence of iterates is by no means guaranteed and claiming optimality of the rate is
far from immediate. In fact, convergence of BR schemes holds under diverse settings requiring either that the
proximal-response map (defined later) admits a suitable contractive property or that player objectives admit a po-
tential function (cf. [19, 22]). Our work draws inspiration from the work by Facchinei and Pang [19] in which the
contractive property of the proximal BR map is employed as a tool to ensure convergence of the iterates produced
by the BR scheme.
Contributions: Given the inherent challenges in solving this problem in finite time, we consider several
inexact variants of this scheme and make the following contributions that are summarized in Table 1:
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(i) Synchronous schemes: We propose a synchronous inexact proximal BR scheme to find the Nash equilibrium,
and prove that the generated iterates converge almost surely and in mean to the unique Nash equilibrium when the
proximal BR map is contractive in 2-norm. Furthermore, when the inexactness is dropped at a suitable rate,
the rate of convergence of the iterates is provably linear or geometric rather than sub-linear. Based on this
linear rate of convergence for the BR iterates and by assuming that an inexact solution is computed via a SA,
we derive the overall iteration complexity in projected SG steps for computing an -NE2 (see definition (26)) and
show that this overall complexity is O(N1+δ/2/2+δ) where δ > 0. In addition, the lower bound of the derived
iteration complexity satisfies Ω(N/2). Furthermore, for a specific selection of the algorithmic parameters, the
overall complexity is shown to be exactly of O(N/2), which is optimal for the resolution of stochastic convex
optimization by standard SA schemes.
(ii)Randomized extension: Subsequently, a randomized inexact proximal BR (BR) scheme motivated by [14,34]
is proposed, in which a subset of players is randomly chosen to update at each iteration. To be specific, player i
is chosen with some positive probability pi at each major iteration. This randomized protocol allows players to
initiate an update according to a local clock, e.g, the Poisson clock, and locally choose the inexactness sequence.
With a suitably selected inexactness sequence, the estimates are shown to converge to the Nash equilibrium almost
surely and in mean at a prescribed linear rate when the proximal BR map is contractive in 2-norm. The expectation
of the total number of projected SG steps to compute an -NE2 is shown to be O
(
(
√
N/)2 ln(η˜
−1
0 )/ ln(η˜
−1)+δ
)
for
some δ > 0, where η˜ and η˜0 are defined in (B.3) and (36), respectively. Further, as noted in Remark 7, this bound
is worse than that shown for the synchronous algorithm, a consequence of the randomized index selection scheme
that accommodates much flexibility into the update scheme.
(iii) Asynchronous and delay-tolerant schemes: Synchronous algorithms require players to update their strate-
gies simultaneously, but this is often difficult to mandate in networked settings with a large collection of noncoop-
erative players. Additionally, players may often not have access to their rivals’ latest strategies. Motivated by the
asynchronous algorithm specified in [9], we propose an asynchronous inexact proximal BR scheme, where each
player determines its update time while using possibly outdated rival information. Yet, we assume that each player
updates at least once in any time interval of length B1, and that the communication delays are uniformly bounded
by B2. When the proximal BR map is contractive in∞-norm, the iterates are proved to converge in mean to the
unique equilibrium at a linear rate for an appropriately chosen inexactness sequence. Furthermore, we derive the
overall iteration complexity of the projected SG steps for computing an -NE∞ (see definition (44)) and show that
the complexity bound is of O
(
(1/)
2B1
(
1+
⌈
B2
B1
⌉)
+δ
)
for some δ > 0. Specially, if the players update in a cyclic
fashion, then the complexity bound improves to O
(
(1/)
2
(
1+
⌈
B2
N
⌉
+δ
))
.
(iv) Incorporating private two-stage recourse: To show that all the aforementioned avenues can be extended
to accommodate recourse-based objectives arising from two-stage stochastic programming [15], we consider an
extended stochastic NEP where each player solves a two-stage stochastic program with recourse. We separately
investigate the case of linear and quadratic recourse with a particular accent on computing subgradients of the
random recourse function. On the basis of the existence and boundedness of the stochastic subgradient, the pro-
posed synchronous, randomized, and asynchronous inexact proximal BR algorithms are still applicable and the
formulated convergence results hold as well.
(v) Preliminary numerics: Finally, our numerical studies on competitive portfolio selection problems and two-
stage competitive capacity expansion problems suggest that the empirical behavior corresponds well with the rate
statements and the complexity bounds.
Organization: The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we formulate the stochastic
Nash game, provide some basic assumptions as well as some background on the proximal BR map. In Section 3,
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Update scheme Asymptotic convergence Rate of convergence Iteration complexity
Synchronous (Algorithm 1)
(using ‖.‖2 norm)
a.s. convergence (Proposition 2 )
convergence in mean (Proposition 3) geometric (Proposition 4)
-NE2:
Theorem 1 (b): O
(
(
√
N/)2+δ
)
Corollary 1: O(N/2)
Randomized (Algorithm 2)
(using ‖.‖2 norm)
a.s. convergence (Lemma 4)
convergence in mean (Lemma 5) geometric (Lemma 5)
-NE2:
Theorem 2: O
(
(
√
N/)2 ln(η˜
−1
0 )/ ln(η˜
−1)+δ
)
Asynchronous (Algorithm 3)
(using ‖.‖∞ norm) convergence in mean (Lemma 7) geometric (Lemma 7)
-NE∞:
Theorem 4(a): O
(
(1/)
2B1
(
1+dB2
B1
e
)
+δ
)
Theorem 4(b): O
(
(1/)
2
(
1+dB2
N
e
)
+δ
)
Table 1: Summary of Contributions
we introduce a synchronous inexact proximal BR scheme, derive rate statements, and analyze the overall itera-
tion complexity when an inexact solution to the BR problem is solved via a SA scheme. A randomized and an
asynchronous inexact proximal BR scheme are proposed in Sections 4 and 5, respectively, where the rate and
complexity statements established. Finally, all the proposed avenues are extended to accommodate recourse-based
objectives in Section 6. We present some numerical results in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8 with a brief
summary of our main findings.
Notations: When referring to a vector x, it is assumed to be a column vector while xT denotes its transpose.
Generally, ‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean vector norm, i.e., ‖x‖ =
√
xTx, while other norms will be specified ap-
propriately (such as the 1-norm or the ∞-norm). We use ΠX [x] to denote the Euclidean projection of a vector
x on a set X , i.e., ΠX [x] = miny∈X ‖x − y‖. We abbreviate “almost surely” by a.s. and use E[z] to denote
the expectation of a random variable z. For of a square matrix A, we denote by ρ(A) the spectral radius and by
λmin(A) the smallest eigenvalue of A+A
T
2 . We denote by ⊗ and Im the Kronecker product and m ×m identity
matrix, respectively.
2 Problem Formulation and Preliminaries
2.1 Problem Statement
There exists a set of N players indexed by i where i ∈ N , {1, · · · , N}. For any i ∈ N , the ith player has a
strategy set Xi ⊆ Rni and a payoff function fi(xi, x−i) depending on its own strategy xi and on the vector of
rivals’ strategies x−i , {xj}j 6=i. Suppose n ,
∑N
i=1 ni, X ,
∏
iXi and X−i ,
∏
j 6=iXj . Let us consider a
stochastic setting of the NEP denoted by (SNash), in which the objective of player i, given rivals’ strategies x−i,
is to solve the following constrained stochastic program
min
xi∈Xi
fi(xi, x−i) , E [ψi(xi, x−i; ξ(ω))] , (SNashi(x−i))
where ψi(·) : X × Rd → R is a scalar-valued function, and the expectation is taken with respect to the random
vector ξ : Ω → Rd defined on the probability space (Ω,F ,P). An NE of the stochastic Nash game (SNash)
x∗ = {x∗i }Ni=1 satisfies the following:
x∗i solves (SNashi(x∗−i)), ∀i ∈ N .
In other words, x∗ is an NE if no player can improve the payoff by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium
strategy x∗i . For notational simplicity, ξ is used to denote ξ(ω) throughout the paper. In this work, we assume
that for any i ∈ N , fi(xi, x−i) and ψi(xi, x−i; ξ) is smooth in xi for every given x−i and ξ. Further, there exists
a stochastic oracle such that for any i ∈ N and every given x, ξ returns a sample ∇xiψi(xi, x−i; ξ), which is an
unbiased estimator of∇xifi(xi, x−i). We impose the following conditions on the stochastic Nash game.
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Assumption 1 Let the following hold.
(a) Xi is a closed, compact, and convex set;
(b) fi(xi, x−i) is convex and twice continuously differentiable in xi over an open set containing Xi for every
x−i ∈ X−i;
(c) For all x−i ∈ X−i and any ω ∈ Ω, ψi(xi, x−i; ξ(ω)) is differentiable in xi over an open set containingXi such
that∇xifi(xi, x−i) = E[∇xiψi(xi, x−i; ξ)];
(d) For any i ∈ N and all x ∈ X , there exists a constant Mi > 0 such that E[‖∇xiψi(xi, x−i; ξ)‖2] ≤M2i .
2.2 Background on proximal BR maps
In this paper, we consider the class of stochastic Nash games in which the proximal BR map (which is defined
subsequently) admits a contractive property [19]. Suppose x̂(y) is defined as follows:
x̂(y) , argmin
x∈X
[
N∑
i=1
E [ψi(xi, y−i; ξ)] +
µ
2
‖x− y‖2
]
. (1)
It is easily seen that the objective function is now separable in xi and (1) reduces to a set of player-specific proximal
BR problems, in which the ith player’s problem is given by the following:
x̂i(y) , argmin
xi∈Xi
[
E [ψi(xi, y−i; ξ)] +
µ
2
‖xi − yi‖2
]
. (2)
Analogous to the avenue adopted in [19], we may define the N ×N real matrix Γ = [γij ]Ni,j=1 :
Γ ,

µ
µ+ζ1,min
ζ12,max
µ+ζ1,min
. . .
ζ1N,max
µ+ζ1,min
ζ21,max
µ+ζ2,min
µ
µ+ζ2,min
. . .
ζ2N,max
µ+ζ2,min
...
. . .
ζN1,max
µ+ζN,min
ζN2,max
µ+ζN,min
. . . µµ+ζN,min
 (3)
with
ζi,min , inf
x∈X
λmin
(∇2xifi(x)) and ζij,max , sup
x∈X
‖∇2xixjfi(x)‖ ∀j 6= i. (4)
Then we obtain the following inequality: ‖x̂1(y
′)− x̂1(y)‖
...
‖x̂N (y′)− x̂N (y)‖
 ≤ Γ
 ‖y
′
1 − y1‖
...
‖y′N − yN‖
 . (5)
If the spectral radius ρ(Γ) < 1, then there exist a scalar a ∈ (0, 1) and a monotonic norm | ‖ • ‖ | such that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x̂1(y
′)− x̂1(y)‖
...
‖x̂N (y′)− x̂N (y)‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ a
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖y
′
1 − y1‖
...
‖y′N − yN‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (6)
Note that sufficient conditions for the contractive property of the BR map x̂(•) are provided in [19, Proposition
12.17].
Remark 1 Let Di ∈ Rni×ni ∀i ∈ N be any arbitrary chosen nonsingular matrices. Define
ζi,min , inf
x∈X
λmin
(
DTi ∇2xifi(x)Di
)
, ζij,max , sup
x∈X
‖DTi ∇2xixjfi(x)Dj‖ ∀j 6= i.
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It is easily seen that definition (4) is only a special case with Di ∈ Rni×ni being an identity matrix. By making
simple modifications to the proof given in [19, Section 12.6.1] we are able to obtain the inequality (5) with Γ
defined by (3). As discussed in [45], matrices Di ∀i ∈ N provide an additional degree of freedom in deriving the
contraction property of the proximal BR map x̂(•).
Recall that the proximal BR x̂i(y) requires solving a stochastic optimization problem defined in (2). Stochastic
optimization problems have been studied extensively over the last several decades through Monte-Carlo sampling
schemes such as SAA and SA. SAA provides a foundation for relating the estimators of an expectation-valued
problem obtained by solving the deterministic sample-average approximation. Asymptotic convergence and error
bounds for the SAA estimators have been extensively investigated in [51]. SA was first considered by Robbins
and Monro [41] for seeking roots of a regression function with noisy observations. Such schemes have found wide
applications in stochastic problems such as convex optimization, variational inequality problems, and systems and
control problems. Here, we apply the SA scheme to estimate the optimal solution of the stochastic BR problem (2).
3 A Synchronous Inexact Proximal BR Scheme
In this section, we present a synchronous inexact proximal BR scheme for which both asymptotic convergence
analysis, rate statements, and overall iteration complexity results are provided.
3.1 Description of algorithm
Recall that the exact proximal BR x̂i(yk) is defined as the following:
x̂i(yk) , argmin
xi∈Xi
[
fi(xi, y−i,k) +
µ
2
‖xi − yi,k‖2
]
. (7)
Since fi(xi, y−i,k) is the expectation of ψi(xi, y−i,k; ξ) with respect to ξ, a closed-form expression of x̂i(yk)
is unavailable. Instead we propose an inexact proximal BR scheme (Algorithm 1) computing an inexact BR that
satisfies (8) rather than computing the exact BR, which is available only in an asymptotic sense. It is worth pointing
out that Fk in equation (8) denotes the σ-field of the entire information used by the algorithm up to (and including)
the update of xk. We will further define Fk in Section 3.4 and specify the deterministic sequence {αi,k}k≥0 in
Algorithm 1 when we proceed to investigate the convergence properties.
Algorithm 1 Inexact proximal BR scheme for stochastic Nash games
Set k := 0. Let yi,0 = xi,0 ∈ Xi, and {αi,k}k≥0 be a given deterministic sequence for i = 1, . . . , N .
(1) For i = 1, . . . , N , let xi,k+1 satisfy the following
xi,k+1 ∈
{
z ∈ Xi : E
[‖z − x̂i(yk)‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ α2i,k a.s.} . (8)
(2) For i = 1, . . . , N , yi,k+1 := xi,k+1;
(3) k := k + 1; If k < K, return to (1); else STOP.
3.2 Convergence analysis
We now proceed to analyze this scheme in greater detail and initiate our discussion by noting the convergence of
the exact BR scheme.
Proposition 1 ( [19]) Consider the stochastic Nash game in which the ith player solves (SNashi(x−i)), given
x−i ∈ X−i. Let the sequence of exact responses be denoted by {y∞k }∞k=1. Assume that the matrix Γ defined by (3)
satisfies ρ(Γ) < 1. Then the following hold:
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(i) The contraction given by (6) holds for the proximal BR map.
(ii) For i = 1, · · · , N, the BR iterates y∞i,k → x∗i as k →∞
Naturally, one may derive the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium from the existence of this contractive property
(cf. [19]). We prove that the sequence {xk}k≥0 generated by Algorithm 1 converges almost surely and in expecta-
tion to the unique Nash equilibrium of the stochastic Nash game in Propositions 2 and 3, respectively. The results
rely on comparing the inexact responses with the exact BR map, which is known to be contractive by the following
sufficient condition:
Assumption 2 The Γ matrix defined in (3) satisfies ‖Γ‖ < 1.
Define a , ‖Γ‖. Then a ∈ (0, 1) by Assumption 2, and hence by (5) we obtain the following:∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x̂1(y
′)− x̂1(y)‖
...
‖x̂N (y′)− x̂N (y)‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ a
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖y
′
1 − y1‖
...
‖y′N − yN‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ∀y, y′ ∈ X. (9)
We utilize the following lemma for random and deterministic recursions to prove the almost sure convergence
and convergence in mean, respectively.
Lemma 1 (a) [38, Lemma 2.2.10] Let {vk}k≥0 be a sequence of random variables, vk ≥ 0, E[v0] < ∞, such
that E[vk+1|v0, · · · , vk] ≤ qkvk + ζk, a.s. where 0 ≤ qk < 1, ζk ≥ 0,
∑∞
k=0(1 − qk) = ∞,
∑∞
k=0 ζk <
∞, and limk→∞ ζk1−qk = 0. Then vk → 0 a.s.
(b) [38, Lemma 2.2.3] Let uk+1 ≤ qkuk+ζk, 0 ≤ qk < 1, ζk ≥ 0, where
∑∞
k=0(1−qk) =∞ and limk→∞ ζk1−qk =
0. Then lim sup
k→∞
uk ≤ 0. In particular, if uk ≥ 0, then lim
k→∞
uk = 0.
Proposition 2 (Almost Sure Convergence) Let the sequence {xk}k≥0 be generated by Algorithm 1. Suppose
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and that αi,k ≥ 0 with
∑∞
k=0 αi,k <∞ for any i ∈ N . Then for any i ∈ N ,
lim
k→∞
xi,k = x
∗
i a.s.
Proof. We begin by noting that x∗i = x̂i(x∗) and examine ‖xi,k+1 − x∗i ‖:
‖xi,k+1 − x∗i ‖ ≤ ‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)‖+ ‖x̂i(yk)− x̂i(x∗)‖, (10)
where the inequality follows from the triangle inequality. Furthermore, by yk = xk and the contractive property
(9) of x̂(•), we have the following bound:∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x̂1(yk)− x̂1(x
∗)‖
...
‖x̂N (yk)− x̂N (x∗)‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x̂1(xk)− x̂1(x
∗)‖
...
‖x̂N (xk)− x̂N (x∗)‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ a
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x1,k − x
∗
1‖
...
‖xN,k − x∗N‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ . (11)
Consequently, from (10) by the triangle inequality, we obtain the following inequality:
vk+1 ,
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x1,k+1 − x
∗
1‖
...
‖xN,k+1 − x∗N‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ a
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x1,k − x
∗
1‖
...
‖xN,k − x∗N‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x1,k+1 − x̂1(yk)‖...
‖xN,k+1 − x̂N (yk)‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ . (12)
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Denote by αmax,k , maxi αi,k. Then by (8) and conditional Jensen’s inequality, we have that for all k ≥ 0:
E

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x1,k+1 − x̂1(yk)‖...
‖xN,k+1 − x̂N (yk)‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∣∣∣∣∣Fk
 ≤
√√√√E[ N∑
i=1
‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)‖2
∣∣Fk
]
≤
√√√√ N∑
i=1
α2i,k ≤
√
Nαmax,k a.s. (13)
By taking expectations conditioned on Fk with respect to both sides of (12), from (13) we have that
E[vk+1|Fk] ≤ avk +
√
Nαmax,k a.s. (14)
Since
∑
k(1 − a) = ∞ and lim
k→∞
αmax,k
(1−a) = 0, by Lemma 1(a) and the summability of αmax,k, we conclude that
vk → 0 a.s. Consequently, the result follows by vk defined in (12). 2
Proposition 3 Let the sequence {xk}k≥0 be generated by Algorithm 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and
that αi,k ≥ 0 with lim
k→∞
αi,k = 0 for any i ∈ N . Then we have the following assertions:
(a) (convergence of the variance of xk) lim
k→∞
Var(xk) = 0.
(b) (convergence in mean) lim
k→∞
E[‖xi,k − x∗i ‖] = 0 ∀i ∈ N .
Proof. (a) Note that the variance of xk may be bounded as follows:
Var(xk) = E
[∥∥E[xk]− xk∥∥2] = E[∥∥E[xk − x∗]− (xk − x∗) ∥∥2] ≤ E[‖xk − x∗‖2]. (15)
By Assumption 1(a), we define the diameter of the Xi as follows:
DXi , sup{d(xi, x′i) : xi, x′i ∈ Xi} <∞. (16)
By (12), we have the following:
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤
N∑
i=1
‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)‖2 + a2‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2a
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x1,k − x
∗
1‖
...
‖xN,k − x∗N‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x1,k+1 − x̂1(yk)‖...
‖xN,k+1 − x̂N (yk)‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ .
Thus, by taking expectations conditioned on Fk, from (8), (13), and (16) we have that
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ a2‖xk − x∗‖2 + N∑
i=1
α2i,k + 2
√√√√ N∑
i=1
D2Xi
√√√√ N∑
i=1
α2i,k a.s. (17)
Since αi,k is deterministic and lim
k→∞
αi,k = 0, by taking expectations on both sides of (17) and by applying
Lemma 1(b) we have that lim
k→∞
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] = 0. Thus, the result (a) follows by the expression (15) .
(b) By Jensen’s inequality, we have that E [‖xi,k − x∗i ‖] ≤
√
E
[
‖xi,k − x∗i ‖2
]
, which implies result (b) by
invoking the fact that lim
k→∞
E[‖xi,k − x∗‖2|] = 0 ∀i ∈ N . 2
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3.3 Rate of convergence
We begin with a supporting lemma that bounds a sub-linear rate by a prescribed linear rate. This has been proven
in [3] but a simpler proof is provided here.
Lemma 2 Given a function zcz with 0 < c < 1. Then for all z ≥ 0, we have that
zcz≤Dqz, where c < q < 1 and D≥ 1
ln(q/c)e
.
Proof. Since zcz≤Dqz for all z ≥ 0. If p , c/q < 1, it follows that maxz≥0 zpz≤D. Then a maximizer of zpz
satisfies the following: pz + zpz ln(p) = 0 implying that z = −1/ln(p) > 0. (z can be seen to be a maximizer by
taking second derivatives). It follows that
max
z≥0
zpz = − 1
ln(p)
p
1
− ln(p) = − 1
ln(p)
(
1
p
) 1
ln(p)
=
1
ln(1/p)
e−1 =
1
ln(q/c)e
. 2
Proposition 4 (Geometric rate of convergence) Consider the synchronous inexact proximal BR scheme (Algo-
rithm 1) where E[‖xi,0 − x∗i ‖] ≤ C and αi,k = ηk+1 for some η ∈ (0, 1). Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
Define c , max{a, η}, and
uk , E

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x1,k − x
∗
1‖
...
‖xN,k − x∗N‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 . (18)
Then the following holds for any q ∈ (c, 1) and D , 1/ ln((q/c)e)
uk ≤
√
N(C +D)qk ∀k ≥ 0. (19)
Proof. By taking expectations on both sides of (12), from (13) we obtain the following recursion:
uk+1 ≤ auk +
√
Nαmax,k ∀k ≥ 0. (20)
Since αmax,k = ηk+1, by (20) we obtain the following sequence of inequalities:
uk ≤ auk−1 +
√
Nηk ≤ aku0 +
√
N
k∑
j=1
ak−jηj ≤ cku0 +
√
N
 k∑
j=1
ck
 = (u0 +√Nk)ck. (21)
By Lemma 2, we have that kck ≤ Dqk for any q ∈ (c, 1) and D ≥ 1/ ln((q/c)e). Then by (21), we get
(u0 +
√
Nk)ck ≤ (u0 +
√
ND)qk.
Since u0 ≤
√
NC by E[‖xi,0 − x∗i ‖] ≤ C ∀i ∈ N , it follows that uk ≤
√
N(C +D)qk. 2
Remark 2 This result shows that if the inexactness sequence is driven to zero at a suitable rate, there is no
degradation in the overall rate of convergence; in effect, the rate stays linear and can be precisely specified.
Notably, the impact of the number of players on the rate appears only in terms of the constant. While there
exists prior research where a geometric rate of convergence is retained by solving subproblems accurately enough
(cf. [21,44]), this result appears to be the first such result in the context of inexact proximal best-response schemes
for stochastic Nash games.
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3.4 Overall iteration complexity analysis
We now utilize the results from the prior subsection to develop overall iteration complexity bounds. Recall that
under the prescribed setting, the regularized variant, as prescribed by (7), is always strongly convex with parameter
µ. Given the strong convexity of each player’s objective function, SA provides an avenue for obtaining an inexact
solution. In such a scheme, at the major iteration k, given yk the ith player takes the following sequence of
stochastic gradient steps from t = 1, . . . , ji,k, where ji,k steps suffice in obtaining an inexact solution of accuracy
αi,k:
zi,t+1 := ΠXi
zi,t − γt (∇xiψi(zi,t, y−i,k; ξti,k) + µ(zi,t − yi,k))︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Gi(zi,t,yk,ξti,k)
 , (SAi,k)
where zi,1 = xi,k, and γt = 1/µ(t+ 1). Note that ∇xiψi(zi,t, y−i,k; ξti,k) denotes the sampled gradient of fi(·) at
point (zi,t, x−i,k) while γt is a non-summable but square summable sequence.
Let the SA scheme (SAi,k) from t = 1, . . . , ji,k be employed for obtaining xi,k+1. Define ξi,k , (ξ1i,k, · · · , ξ
ji,k
i,k ),
ξ
[t]
i,k = (ξ
1
i,k, · · · , ξti,k), andFk , σ{x0, ξi,l, i ∈ N , 0 ≤ l ≤ k−1}. Then by Algorithm 1, we see that xk is adapted
to Fk, and x̂i(yk) is also adapted to Fk since x̂i(yk) = x̂i(xk) is an optimal solution to the parameterized problem
(7). We derive an error bound for (SAi,k) as specified by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Let Assumption 1 hold. Consider the synchronous inexact proximal BR scheme given by Algorithm
1. Assume that for any t = 1, · · · , ji,k, E
[
ψi(zi,t, y−i,k; ξti,k)
∣∣σ{Fk, ξ[t−1]i,k }] = ∇xifi(zi,t, y−i,k) a.s., and
E
[
‖ψi(zi,t, y−i,k; ξti,k)‖2
∣∣σ{Fk, ξ[t−1]i,k }] = ‖∇xifi(zi,t, y−i,k)‖2 a.s. DefineQi , 2M2iµ2 +2D2Xi . Then the follow-
ing holds for any t = 1, · · · , ji,k :
E
[‖zi,t − x̂i(yk)‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ Qi/(t+ 1) a.s.
Proof. Set At = ‖zi,t− x̂i(yk)‖2 and at = E
[
At
∣∣Fk] . Since Xi is a convex set and x̂i(yk) ∈ Xi, from algorithm
(SAi,k) by the nonexpansive property of the projection operator we have
At+1 ≤ At + γ2t ‖Gi(zi,t, yk, ξti,k)‖2 − 2γt (zi,t − x̂i(yk))T Gi(zi,t, yk, ξti,k). (22)
Since xk is adapted toFk, by (SAi,k) it is seen that zi,t is adapted to σ{Fk, ξ[t−1]i,k }. Then by invokingE
[
ψi(zi,t, y−i,k; ξti,k)
∣∣σ{Fk, ξ[t−1]i,k }] =
∇xifi(zi,t, y−i,k) a.s., and the tower property of conditional expectation we have that for any t = 1, · · · , ji,k:
E
[
(zi,t − x̂i(yk))T Gi(zi,t, yk, ξti,k)
∣∣Fk] = E [E [(zi,t − x̂i(yk))T Gi(zi,t, yk, ξti,k)∣∣σ{Fk, ξ[t−1]i,k }] ∣∣∣Fk]
= E
[
(zi,t − x̂i(yk))T (∇xifi(zi,t, y−i,k) + µ(zi,t − yi,k))
∣∣∣Fk] a.s. (23)
Note that f˜i(xi) = fi(xi, y−i,k) + µ2‖xi − yi,k‖2 is strongly convex with parameter µ and x̂i(yk) denotes the
optimal solution of minxi∈Xi f˜i(xi). Then by zi,t ∈ Xi, we may conclude that for any t = 1, · · · , ji,k:
(zi,t − x̂i(yk))T ∇f˜i(x̂i(yk)) ≥ 0,
and (zi,t − x̂i(yk))T
(
∇f˜i(zi,t)−∇f˜i(x̂i(yk))
)
≥ µ‖zi,t − x̂i(yk)‖2 = µAt.
Consequently, by adding the two inequalities we obtain the following:
(zi,t − x̂i(yk))T (∇xifi(zi,t, y−i,k) + µ(zi,t − yi,k)) = (zi,t − x̂i(yk))T ∇f˜i(zi,t) ≥ µAt.
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After taking conditional expectations and invoking (23), we obtain
E
[
(zi,t − x̂i(yk))T Gi(zi,t, yk, ξti,k)
∣∣Fk] ≥ µE [At∣∣Fk] = µat a.s. (24)
Since ‖Gi(zi,t, yk, ξti,k)‖2 ≤ 2‖∇xiψi(zi,t, x−i,k; ξti,k)‖2 + 2‖µ(zi,t − yi,k)‖2, by Assumption 1(d) and (16),
and by invoking E
[
‖ψi(zi,t, y−i,k; ξti,k)‖2
∣∣σ{Fk, ξ[t−1]i,k }] = ‖∇xifi(zi,t, y−i,k)‖2 a.s., we have that
E
[
‖Gi(zi,t, yk, ξti,k)‖2
∣∣σ{Fk, ξ[t−1]i,k }] ≤ 2M2i + 2‖µ(zi,t − yi,k)‖2 ≤ 2(M2i + µ2D2Xi) a.s.
Then by the tower property of conditional expectations we obtain the following:
E
[‖Gi(zi,t, yk, ξti,k)‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ 2(M2i + µ2D2Xi) a.s. (25)
By taking expectations conditioned on Fk on both sides of (22), from (24) and (25) we have
at+1 ≤ (1− 2µγt)at + 2(M2i + µ2D2Xi)γ2t a.s.
By substituting γt = 1µ(t+1) we obtain at+1 ≤ (1− 2t+1)at + Qi(t+1)2 a.s., where Qi ,
2M2i
µ2
+ 2D2Xi .
We inductively prove that at ≤ Qi(t+1) a.s. By (16) we have that A1 ≤ D2Xi , and hence a1 ≤ Qi2 . Suppose that
at ≤ Qi(t+1) a.s. holds for some t ≥ 1. It remains to show that at+1 ≤ Qi(t+2) a.s. Note that
at+1 ≤
(
1− 2
t+ 1
)
Qi
(t+ 1)
+
Qi
(t+ 1)2
= Qi
t
(t+ 1)2
≤ Qi 1
t+ 2
a.s.,
where the last inequality holds by the fact that t(t+2) ≤ (t+1)2. Consequently, we conclude that at ≤ Qi(t+1) a.s.,
and hence the lemma follows. 2
To address strategies that are an approximate Nash equilibrium, we use the concept of −Nash equilibrium. A
random strategy profile x : Ω→ Rn is an −NE2 if
E
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x1 − x
∗
1‖
...
‖xN − x∗N‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ . (26)
Next, we derive a bound on the overall iteration complexity for the synchronous inexact BR scheme.
Theorem 1 Let Algorithm 1 be applied to the N−player stochastic Nash game (SNash), where E[‖xi,0−x∗i ‖] ≤
C and αi,k = ηk+1 for some η ∈ (0, 1). Assume that an inexact solution to the proximal BR problem given by (8)
is computed via (SAi,k). Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the following hold.
(a) (Overall iteration complexity) Define c , max{a, η}, let q ∈ (c, 1), and D = 1/ ln((q/c)e). Then the
number of projected stochastic gradient steps for player i to compute an −NE2 is no greater than
`i(η) ,
Qi
η4 ln(1/η2)
(√
N(C +D)

) ln(1/η2)
ln(1/q)
+

ln
(√
N(C +D)/
)
ln(1/q)
 . (27)
(b) (Bounds on complexity) The expression (27) satisfies `i(η) = Ω(1/2). By setting η = a and D =
1+2δ−1
e ln(a−1) , `i(a) satisfies the following for any given δ > 0:
`i(a) ≤ Qi
a4 ln(1/a2)
(√
N(C +D)

)2+δ
+
⌈
ln
(√
N(C +D)

)
2 + δ
2 ln(a−1)
⌉
. (28)
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Proof. (a) Suppose ji,k =
⌈
Qi
η2(k+1)
⌉
steps of the SA scheme (SAi,k) are taken at major iteration k to obtain xi,k+1,
i.e., xi,k+1 = zi,ji,k . Then by Lemma 3 and ji,k ≥ Qiη2(k+1) , we have that
E
[‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)‖2∣∣Fk] = E [‖zi,ji,k − x̂i(yk)‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ Qiji,k ≤ η2(k+1) = α2i,k ∀i ∈ N .
Based on (19), we have that
uk+1 ≤
√
N(C +D)qk+1 ≤ ⇒ qk+1 ≤ √
N(C +D)
, ¯⇒ k ≥ ln(1/¯)
ln(1/q)
− 1. (29)
By recalling that for β > 1, the following holds:
K∑
k=1
βk ≤
∫ K+1
1
βxdx ≤ β
K+1
ln(β)
, (30)
which allows us to bound the overall iteration complexity of player i as follows:
⌈
ln(1/¯)
ln(1/q)
⌉
−1∑
k=0
ji,k ≤
⌈
ln(1/¯)
ln(1/q)
⌉
−1∑
k=0
(
1 +
Qi
η2(k+1)
)
=
⌈
ln(1/¯)
ln(1/q)
⌉∑
k=1
Qi
η2k
+
⌈
ln(1/¯)
ln(1/q)
⌉
≤ Qi
ln(1/η2)
η
−2
(
ln(1/¯)
ln(1/q)
+2
)
+
⌈
ln(1/¯)
ln(1/q)
⌉
.
Note that
η
−2 ln(1/¯)
ln(1/q) =
(
eln(η
−2)
) ln(1/¯)
ln(1/q)
= eln(1/¯))
ln(η−2)
ln(1/q)
= (1/¯)
ln(1/η2)
ln(1/q) . (31)
Therefore, the overall iteration complexity of player i is bounded by the following:
Qi
η4 ln(1/η2)
(
1
¯
) ln(1/η2)
ln(1/q)
+
⌈
ln(1/¯)
ln(1/q)
⌉
.
Then the result (a) follows by the definition of ¯ in (29).
(b). The proof of the first assertion `i(η) = Ω(1/2) can be found in [50, Proposition 4(b)].
Define q = ceδ0/2, where δ0 =
δ ln(a−1)
1+δ/2 . Since c = a by η = a, we obtain the following:
ln(1/q) = ln(a−1)− δ0/2 = 2 ln(a
−1)
2 + δ
,
ln(1/η2)
ln(1/q)
=
2 ln(a−1)
ln(1/q)
= 2 +
δ0
ln(a−1)
1+δ/2
= 2 + δ,
and D = 1/ ln((q/c)e) = 1/ ln(eδ0e/2) =
2
δ0e
=
1 + 2δ−1
e ln(a−1)
.
Consequently, by the expression `i(η) defined in (27), we obtain (28) when η is set as a. 2
Remark 3 Several points need reinforcement in light of the obtained complexity statements:
(i) First, the iteration complexity bound grows slowly in the number of players, a desirable feature of any dis-
tributed algorithm employed for games with a large collection of agents.
(ii) Second, when N = 1, the complexity bound reduces to O(1/2+δ) which can be made arbitrarily close to the
bound for standard stochastic convex programs suggesting that the bounds may well be optimal.
(iii) Third, in an effort to examine the tightness of the bound, we show that our bound on the derived iteration
complexity is bounded from below by a term that is of the order O(N/2). Note this is not a lower bound on the
complexity itself which we leave as future research.
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Corollary 1 Let Algorithm 1 be applied to the N−player stochastic Nash game (SNash), where αi,k = ηk+1 for
some η ∈ (a, 1), E[‖xi,0 − x∗i ‖] ≤ C, and an inexact proximal BR solution satisfying (8) is computed via (SAi,k).
Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the number of projected gradient steps for player i to compute an −NE2
is no greater than
Qi
η4 ln(1/η2)
√N
(
C + ηη−a
)

2 +

ln
(√
N

(
C + ηη−a
))
ln(1/η)
 . (32)
Proof. Since aη ∈ (0, 1) by η ∈ (a, 1), we have that
k∑
j=1
ak−jηj = ηk
k−1∑
j=0
(a/η)j ≤ 1− (a/η)
k
1− a/η η
k =
ηk − ak
1− a/η .
Then by u0 ≤
√
NC, a < η, and by invoking the second inequality in (21), we obtain the following bound:
uk ≤
√
NCak +
√
Nη
η − a(η
k − ak) ≤
(√
NC +
√
Nη
η − a
)
ηk.
Thus, by setting k¯ =
⌈
ln(1/¯)
ln(1/η)
⌉
with ¯ = √
N(C+η/(η−a)) , we get uk+1 ≤  ∀k ≥ k¯ − 1. Suppose ji,k =⌈
Qi
η2(k+1)
⌉
steps of (SAi,k) are taken at major iteration k to obtain xi,k+1. Then by Lemma 3, we have that
E
[‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ α2i,k for all i ∈ N . By invoking (30) for β > 1, we may bound the iteration
complexity of player i as follows:⌈
ln(1/¯)
ln(1/η)
⌉
−1∑
k=0
ji,k =
⌈
ln(1/¯)
ln(1/η)
⌉∑
k=1
Qi
η2k
+
⌈
ln(1/¯)
ln(1/η)
⌉
≤ Qi
ln(1/η2)
η
−2
(
ln(1/¯)
ln(1/η)
+2
)
+
⌈
ln(1/¯)
ln(1/η)
⌉
which results in (32) by utilizing (31) and by recalling ¯ = √
N(C+η/(η−a)) . 2
Remark 4 It seems that Corollary 1 gives better results than those of Theorem 1 since it shows that the iteration
complexity is exactly of O(1/2) instead of O(1/2+δ). However, Corollary 1 restricts the parameter η to be
η ∈ (a, 1) while Theorem 1 provides more flexibility on the selection of η only by requiring η ∈ (0, 1). As a matter
of fact, the numerical results demonstrated in Table 3 indicate that smaller η ∈ (0, 1) may give better empirical
iteration complexity. In the following two sections, we establish the iteration complexity for the randomized and
the asynchronous algorithms through the same path of Theorem 1.
We now provide a related result for a probabilistically -Nash equilibrium. Specifically, a random strategy
profile x : Ω→ Rn is an Pδ−NE2 if
P
ω :
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 ‖x1(ω)− x
∗
1‖
...
‖xN (ω)− x∗N‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 
 ≥ (1− δ).
Corollary 2 Let Algorithm 1 be applied to the N−player stochastic Nash game (SNash), where αi,k = ηk+1 for
some η ∈ (a, 1), E[‖xi,0 − x∗i ‖] ≤ C, and an inexact proximal BR solution satisfying (8) is computed via (SAi,k).
Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the iteration complexity for player i to compute an Pδ−NE2 is bounded
by (28) with  replaced by δ.
Note. This follows because uk ≤ δ implies that P(vk ≥ ) ≤ E[vk]/ = uk/ ≤ δ by the Markov inequality,
where vk and uk are defined by (12) and (18), respectively. Then the δ-NE2 x is also an Pδ−NE2 solution.
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4 A Randomized Inexact Proximal BR Algorithm
In this section, we propose a randomized inexact proximal BR algorithm, where a subset of players is randomly
chosen to update their strategies in each major iteration, and the inexact proximal BR solutions are achieved via
the SA scheme.
4.1 Algorithm description
The randomized block coordinate descent method was proposed in [34] to solve large-scale optimization prob-
lems, where the coordinates are partitioned into several blocks and at each iteration only one block of variables is
randomly chosen to update while the other blocks are kept invariant. Subsequently, this convergence was analyzed
to nonconvex and fixed-point regimes [14,31,34,40]. Motivated by these research, we design a randomized inexact
proximal BR scheme as follows: For any i ∈ N , let {χi,k}k≥0 be a sequence of i.i.d Bernoulli random variables
taking values in {0, 1}. The variable χi,k signals whether the ith player updates at major iteration k: if χi,k = 1,
then player i initiates an update at major iteration k and computes an inexact proximal BR solution satisfying (33),
where Fk is the σ-field of the entire information used by the algorithm up to (and including) the update of xk,
and αi,k is a nonnegative random variable adapted to Fk. It is worth noticing that Fk contains the sample χi,l for
any i ∈ N and l : 0 ≤ l ≤ k − 1, and αi,k may also depend on the samples {χi,l}0≤l≤k−1. We define Fk in
Section 4.3, and specify the selection of the sequence {αi,k}k≥0 when we proceed to investigate the convergence
properties for which we need the following condition in the convergence analysis.
Algorithm 2 Randomized inexact proximal BR scheme
Let k := 0, yi,0 = xi,0 ∈ Xi for i = 1, . . . , N .
(1) If χi,k = 1, then player i updates xi,k+1 satisfying the following:
xi,k+1 ∈
{
z ∈ Xi : E
[‖z − x̂i(yk)‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ α2i,k a.s.} , (33)
where x̂i(yk) is defined in (7). Otherwise, xi,k+1 = xi,k.
(2) For i = 1, . . . , N , yi,k+1 := xi,k+1;
(3) k := k + 1; If k < K, return to (1); else STOP.
Assumption 3 For any i ∈ N , P(χi,k = 1) = pi > 0 and χi,k is independent of Fk.
Remark 5 We make the following clarifications on Assumption 3:
(i) The condition P(χi,k = 1) = pi > 0 guarantees that each player initiates an update with positive probability
at major iteration k of Algorithm 2. It accommodates the special case where only one player is randomly chosen
with positive probility to update in each iteration.
(ii) The Poisson model [4,11] is a special case: Each player i ∈ N is activated according to a local Poisson clock,
which ticks according to a Poisson process with rate %i > 0. Suppose that there is a virtual global clock which
ticks whenever any of the local Poisson clocks tick. Suppose that the local Poisson clocks are independent, then
the global clock ticks according to a Poisson process with rate
∑N
i=1 %i. Let Zk denote the time of the k-th tick
of the global clock, and Ik ∈ {1, · · · , N} denote the set of players whose clocks tick at time Zk. Since the local
Poisson clocks are independent, with probability one, Ik contains a single element and P(Ik = i) = %i∑N
i=1 %i
, pi.
Besides, the memoryless property of the Poisson process indicates that the process {Ik}k≥0 is i.i.d. As a result,
the processes {χi,k} ∀i ∈ N are mutually independent, and for each i ∈ N , {χi,k} is an i.i.d sequence with
P(χi,k = 1) = pi > 0 and
∑N
i=1 pi = 1.
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4.2 Convergence analysis
We now establish the almost sure convergence and the geometric rate of convergence of the {xk} to x∗ under
suitable conditions on the inexactness sequences {αi,k}, i ∈ N .
Lemma 4 (a.s. convergence) Let {xk}k≥0 be generated by Algorithm 2. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
For any i ∈ N , 0 ≤ αi,k < 1 and
∑∞
k=0 αi,k <∞ a.s. Then for any i ∈ N , lim
k→∞
xi,k = x
∗
i a.s.
Proof. See Appendix A. 2
Define βi,0 = 0 and βi,k =
∑k−1
p=0 χi,p for all k ≥ 1. Thus, βi,k is adapted to Fk. Note that for the Poisson
model described in Remark 5, players may not able to know the exact number of ticks of the global clock. Then it
is impractical to set αi,k be a function of k, instead, a function of βi,k is appropriate.
Lemma 5 (Geometric Convergence) Let {xk}k≥0 be generated by Algorithm 2, where E[‖xi,0 − x∗i ‖] ≤ C and
αi,k = η
βi,k+1 for some η ∈ (0, 1). Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Define c˜ , max{a˜, η˜} with a˜ and η˜
defined by (B.1) and (B.3), respectively. Then the following holds for any q˜ ∈ (c˜, 1):
E [‖xk − x∗‖P ] ≤
√
N(C˜ + D˜)q˜k ∀k ≥ 0,
where ‖ · ‖P is defined in (A.2), D , 1/ ln((q˜/c˜)e), C˜ = C
(∑N
i=1N
−1p−1i
)1/2
, and D˜ = Dηη˜−1.
Proof. See Appendix B. 2
Remark 6 By ‖ · ‖P defined in (A.2), we get ‖x‖2P ≥ 1pmax
∑N
i=1 ‖xi‖2, where pmax = maxi∈N pi. Thus,
‖xk − x∗‖P ≥ 1√
pmax
√√√√ N∑
i=1
‖xi,k − x∗i ‖2 =
1√
pmax
vk,
where vk is defined in (12). Then by Lemma 5 and uk is defined in (18), we have that uk ≤ (pmax)1/2E[‖xk −
x∗‖P ] ≤ (Npmax)1/2(C˜ + D˜)q˜k.
4.3 Overall iteration complexity
We proceed to estimate the iteration complexity, where the inexact proximal BR solution is computed via a SA
scheme. At the major iteration k: if χi,k = 1, then player i takes SG steps (SAi,k) from t = 1, . . . , ji,k. We define
ξi,k, Ik, Fk as ξi,k , (ξ1i,k, · · · , ξ
ji,k
i,k ), Ik , {i ∈ N : χi,k = 1}, and Fk , σ{x0, {ξi,l}i∈Ik , {χi,l}i∈N , 0 ≤ l ≤
k − 1}, respectively. Then, by Algorithm 2 , xk is adapted to Fk. Similar to the proof of Lemma 3, we obtain the
following result for the SA scheme (SAi,k).
Lemma 6 Let Assumption 1 hold. Assume that for any i ∈ Ik the random variables {ξti,k}1≤t≤ji,k are i.i.d, and
in addition, that the random vector ξi,k is independent of Fk. Then for any i ∈ Ik and any t ≥ 1 we have that
E[‖zi,t − x̂i(yk)‖2
∣∣Fk] ≤ Qi/(t+ 1) a.s.
Theorem 2 Let the sequence {xk}k≥0 be generated by Algorithm 2, where αi,k = ηβi,k+1 for some η ∈ (0, 1)
and E[‖xi,0 − x∗i ‖] ≤ C. Suppose that an inexact solution characterized by (33) is computed via (SAi,k). Let
Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Suppose a˜, η˜ and η˜0 are defined by (B.1), (B.3) and (36). Define c˜ , max{a˜, η˜} and
let q˜ ∈ (c˜, 1). Then expectation of the number of projected gradient steps for player i to compute an −NE2 is no
greater than
˜`
i(η) ,
piQi
η2η˜20 ln(1/η˜
2
0)
(
1
˜
) ln(1/η˜20)
ln(1/q˜)
+
⌈
ln(1/˜)
ln(1/q˜)
⌉
, (34)
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where ˜ , 
(Npmax)1/2(C˜+D˜)
with C˜ = C
(∑N
i=1N
−1p−1i
)1/2
and D˜ = Dηη˜−1 with D , 1/ ln((q˜/c˜)e). If
η = a, then given any δ > 0, ˜`i(η) satisfies the following upper bound:
˜`
i(η) ≤ piQi
η˜2η2 ln(1/η˜2)
(
1
˜
)2 ln(η˜−10 )/ ln(η˜−1)+δ
+
⌈
ln(1/˜)
(
1
ln(η˜−1)
+
δ
2 ln(η˜−10 )
)⌉
. (35)
Proof. Suppose ji,k =
⌈
Qi
η
2(βi,k+1)
⌉
steps of the SA scheme (SAi,k) are taken at major iteration k to obtain xi,k+1,
i.e., xi,k+1 = zi,ji,k . Then by Lemma 6, it follows that
E
[‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yk)‖2∣∣Fk] = E [‖zi,ji,k − x̂i(yk)‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ Qiji,k ≤ α2i,k ∀i ∈ N .
By Remark 6, we have that
uk+1 ≤ (Npmax)1/2(C˜ + D˜)q˜k+1 ≤ ⇒ k ≥ ln(1/¯)
ln(1/q˜)
− 1,
where ˜ , 
(Npmax)1/2(C˜+D˜)
. Similar to (B.3) we have that
E[η−2βi,k ] = (piη−2 + 1− pi)k =
(
pi(η
−2 − 1) + 1)k ≤ (pmax(η−2 − 1) + 1)k , η˜−2k0 ∀i ∈ N . (36)
Then by invoking (30) for β > 1, the expectation of the overall iteration complexity of player i is bounded by the
following:
E

⌈
ln(1/˜)
ln(1/q˜)
⌉
−1∑
k=0
ji,kχi,k
 =
⌈
ln(1/˜)
ln(1/q˜)
⌉
−1∑
k=0
E [ji,k]E[χi,k] (since χi,k is independent of ji,k)
≤
d ln(1/˜)
ln(1/q˜)
e−1∑
k=0
(
piQi
η2η˜2k0
+ 1
)
=
η˜20
η2
d ln(1/˜)
ln(1/q˜)
e∑
k=1
piQi
η˜2k0
+
⌈
ln(1/˜)
ln(1/q˜)
⌉
≤ η˜
2
0
η2
piQi
ln(1/η˜20)
 1
η˜
2
(
ln(1/˜)
ln(1/q˜)
+2
)
0
+ ⌈ ln(1/˜)
ln(1/q˜)
⌉
,
which results in (34) by (31). If η = a, then by a˜ and η˜ defined in (B.1) and (B.3), we have that a˜ = η˜ and c˜ = a˜.
Define q˜ = η˜eδ0/2, where δ0 =
δ ln(η˜−1)
ln(η˜−10 )/ ln(η˜−1)+δ/2
. Then we obtain the following:
ln(1/q˜) = ln(η˜−1)− δ0/2 = ln(η˜
−1
0 )
ln(η˜−10 )/ ln(η˜−1) + δ/2
=
1
1/ ln(η˜−1) + δ/2 ln(η˜−10 )
,
ln(1/η˜20)
ln(1/q˜)
=
2 ln(η˜−10 )
ln(1/q˜)
=
2 ln(η˜−10 )
ln(η˜−1)
+ δ,
and D = 1/ ln((q˜/c˜)e) = 1/ ln(eδ0e/2) =
2
δ0e
=
ln(η˜−10 )/ ln(η˜
−1) + 2δ−1
e ln(η˜−1)
. (37)
Consequently, the result (35) follows by the expression ˜`i(η˜) defined in (34). 2
Remark 7 We make the following illustrations on Theorem 2:
(i) If pi = 1 ∀i ∈ N , then Q˜ = Q and pmin = 1. Thus, from (B.1), (B.3), (36) we see that a˜ = a, η˜ = η, η˜0 = η,
and hence C˜ = C, D˜ = D. As a result, the results of Lemma 5 and Theorem 2 for the randomized scheme reduce
to those given in Proposition 4 and Theorem 1 for the synchronous scheme, respectively.
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(ii) Note that the iteration complexity in Theorem 2 of the randomized algorithm is described via the expected
number of projected gradient steps, since the number of gradient steps to get an inexact solution (33) is a random
variable dependent on the realization of updates in the associated trajectory.
(iii) By definitions (B.3) and (36) we have that
(η˜/η˜0)
2 = 1 + pmax(η
−2 − 1)pmin
(
1
pmin
− η
2
pmax
− (1− η2)
)
≥ 1 + pmax(1− pmin)η−2(1− η2)2 ≥ 1,
where the equality holds only if pmin = 1. Thus, for the case pmin < 1, the complexity bound is greater than the
bounds derived in Proposition 4 and Theorem 1, a consequence of the cost of randomization.
5 An Asynchronous Inexact Proximal BR Algorithm
Asynchronous methods date back to [12] when they were employed for the solution to systems of linear equations.
Subsequently, they were used in optimization problems, in which a partially asynchronous gradient projection
algorithm is proposed in [9], while the convergence rate is analyzed in [52]. Here, we adapt the scheme developed
in [9] to stochastic Nash games and propose an asynchronous inexact proximal BR algorithm. Recall that in [9], the
∞-norm is utilized in the rate analysis of the asynchronous schemes for problems with maximum norm contraction
mappings. By assuming that the proximal BR map is contractive in the ∞-norm, we obtain a geometric rate of
convergence for an appropriately chosen inexactness sequence, establish the overall iteration complexity in terms
of the number of projected gradient steps, and analyze the associated complexity bound.
5.1 Algorithm design
The synchronous algorithm designed in the previous section requires that all players update their strategies si-
multaneously. In a network with a large collection of noncooperative players, players might not be able to make
simultaneous updates nor may they have access to their rivals’ latest information. In this context, we propose the
following asynchronous scheme. Let T = {0, 1, 2, · · · } be a set of epochs at which one or more players update
their strategies. Denote by Ik ∈ N the set of players which update their strategies at time k. For any i ∈ Ik, player
i may not obtain its rivals’ latest information, instead, the outdated data yik , (x1,k−τi1(k), · · · , xN,k−τiN (k)) is
available to player i, where τij(k) ≤ k, j = 1, · · · , N are random nonnegative integers representing communica-
tion delays from player j to player i at time k. Set τii(k) = 0 without loss of generality.
The following Algorithm 3 presents the asynchronous inexact proximal BR scheme, whereFk = σ
{F ′k, {τij(k)}i∈Ik,j∈N}
with F ′k being the σ-field of the entire information employed by the algorithm up to (and including) the update of
xk. It is worth noticing that yik is adapted to Fk while is not adapted to F ′k since yik depends on {τij(k)}j∈N . We
define Fk in Section 5.3 while the sequence {αi,k} will be specified when analyzing the convergence properties of
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Asynchronous inexact proximal BR scheme
Let k := 0, xi,0 ∈ Xi for i ∈ N .
(1) For any i ∈ Ik, set yik = (x1,k−τi1(k), · · · , xN,k−τiN (k)).
(2) If i ∈ Ik, then player i updates xi,k+1 that satisfies the following:
xi,k+1 ∈
{
z ∈ Xi : E
[‖z − x̂i(yik)‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ α2i,k a.s.} , (38)
where x̂i(yik) is defined in (7) with yk replaced by y
i
k. Otherwise, xi,k+1 = xi,k.
(3) k := k + 1; If k < K, return to (1); else STOP.
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We impose the following assumptions on the asynchronous protocol, and on the parameters ζi,min, ζij,max, i, j =
1, · · · , N that are defined in (4).
Assumption 4 (a) The sequence of sets {Ik}k≥0 is deterministic.
(b) Each player i ∈ N updates its strategy at least once during any time interval of length bi. In addition, there
exists a positive integer B1 such that bi ≤ B1 ∀i ∈ N ;
(c) There exists a random variable τij such that τij(k) ≤ τij ∀k ≥ 0, i ∈ Ik, j ∈ N a.s. Furthermore, there exists
a nonnegative integer B2 such that τij ≤ B2 ∀i, j ∈ N a.s.
By Assumption 4(b) we see that for any k ≥ 0 and any i ∈ Ik, j ∈ N
max{0, k −B2} ≤ max{0, k − τij} ≤ k − τij(k) ≤ k a.s. (39)
Assumption 5 (Strict Diagonal Dominance) For any i = 1, · · · , N , ζi,min >
∑
j 6=i ζij,max.
Then from this assumption by Γ defined in (3), we have that a∞ , ‖Γ‖∞ < 1. Let y : Ω → X be a random
variable defined on the probability space (Ω,F ,P). Then by taking expectations on both sides of (5), and by taking
the infinity norm, we have that∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 E[‖x̂1(y)− x̂1(x
∗)‖]
...
E[‖x̂N (y)− x̂N (x∗)‖]

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ a∞
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 E[‖y1 − x
∗
1‖]
...
E[‖yN − x∗N‖]

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
.
As a result, by x∗i = x̂i(x
∗) we see that for any i = 1, · · · , N :
E[‖x̂i(y)− x∗i ‖] = E[‖x̂i(y)− x̂i(x∗)‖] ≤ a∞max
i∈N
E[‖yi − x∗i ‖]. (40)
5.2 Rate of convergence
Denote by βi,k the number of updates player i has carried out up to (and including) major iteration k.
Lemma 7 Let the asynchronous inexact proximal BR scheme (Algorithm 3) be applied to theN -player stochastic
Nash game (SNash), where αi,k = ηβi,k for some scalar η ∈ (0, 1) and E[‖xi,0−x∗i ‖] ≤ C. Suppose Assumptions
1, 4, and 5 hold. Then we have the following for any k ≥ 0:
max
i∈N
E[‖xi,k − x∗i ‖] ≤ (C + k)ρ
⌊
k
B1
⌋
, (41)
where ρ = (max{a∞, η})1/(n0+1) with n0 ,
⌈
B2
B1
⌉
. Furthermore, if q > c , ρ
1
B1 , and D≥1/ ln((q/c)e),
max
i∈N
E[‖xi,k − x∗i ‖] ≤ ρ−
B1−1
B1 (C +D)qk, ∀k ≥ 0. (42)
Proof. See Appendix C. 2
5.3 Overall iteration complexity analysis
We proceed to derive a bound on the overall iteration complexity, when the inexact proximal BR solution is
computed via SA. At major iteration k, if i ∈ Ik, then given yik, the ith player takes the following sequence of
stochastic gradient steps from t = 1, . . . , ji,k
zi,t+1 := ΠXi
[
zi,t − γt
(∇xiψi(zi,t, yi−i,k; ξti,k) + µ(zi,t − xi,k))] , (43)
where zi,1 = xi,k, and γt = 1/µ(t + 1). Define F ′k , σ{x0, ξi,l, {τi(l)}i∈Il , 0 ≤ l ≤ k − 1} and Fk ,
σ{F ′k, {τi(k)}i∈Ik}, where τi(k) , (τi1(k), · · · , τiN (k)). Then by Algorithm 3, we see that xk is adapted to F ′k
while {yik}i∈Ik is adapted to Fk. Since F ′k ⊂ Fk, similar to Lemma 3, we also have the following result for the
scheme (43).
18
Lemma 8 Let Assumption 1 hold. Consider the asynchronous inexact proximal BR scheme given by Algorithm 3.
Assume that for any i ∈ Ik and any t = 1, · · · , ji,k,E
[
ψi(zi,t, y
i
−i,k; ξ
t
i,k)
∣∣σ{Fk, ξ[t−1]i,k }] = ∇xifi(zi,t, yi−i,k) a.s.,
and E
[
‖ψi(zi,t, yi−i,k; ξti,k)‖2
∣∣σ{Fk, ξ[t−1]i,k }] = ‖∇xifi(zi,t, yi−i,k)‖2 a.s. Then for any i ∈ Ik and any t =
1, · · · , ji,k, we obtain that E[‖zi,t − x̂i(yik)‖2
∣∣Fk] ≤ Qi/(t+ 1) a.s.
Distinct from the definition of −Nash equilibrium given in (26), for the asynchronous algorithm a random
strategy profile x : Ω→ Rn is called an −NE∞ when
max
i∈N
E[‖xi − x∗i ‖] ≤ . (44)
Theorem 3 Let Algorithm 3 be applied to the stochastic Nash game (SNash), where αi,k = ηβi,k for some scalar
η ∈ (0, 1) and E[‖xi,0 − x∗i ‖2] ≤ C2. Suppose that an inexact solution characterized by (38) is computed via
(SAi,k). Let Assumptions 1, 4 and 5 hold. Suppose ρ = (max{a∞, η})1/(n0+1) with n0 =
⌈
B2
B1
⌉
. Define c , ρ
1
B1
and let q ∈ (c, 1). Then the number of projected gradient steps for player i to compute an −NE∞ is no greater
than
`
(1)
i (η) ,
Qi
η4 ln(1/η2)
(
1
ˆ
) ln(1/η2)
ln(1/q)
+
⌈
ln(1/ˆ)
ln(1/q)
⌉
, (45)
where ˆ is defined in (46) with D ≥ / ln((q/c)e). In particular, if B1 = 1, B2 = 0, then (45) reduces to
Qi
η4 ln(1/η2)
(
C+D

) ln(1/η2)
ln(1/q) with q > c , max{a∞, η} and D≥1/ ln((q/c)e).
Proof. For any i ∈ Ik, let ji,k = d Qiη2(k+1) e be the number of steps of the scheme (43) taken by player i in major
iteration k to obtain xi,k+1, i.e., xi,k+1 := zi,ji,k . Since βi,k ≤ k + 1 and η ∈ (0, 1), by Lemma 8, we have the
following for any i ∈ Ik:
E
[‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yik)‖2∣∣Fk] = E [‖zi,ji,k − x̂i(yik)‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ Qiji,k ≤ η2(k+1) ≤ η2βi,k = α2i,k a.s.
By (42), we may obtain a lower bound on k as follows:
max
i∈N
E[‖xi,k+1 − x∗i ‖] ≤ ρ−
B1−1
B1 (C +D)qk+1 ≤ ⇒ qk+1 ≤ 
C +D
ρ
B1−1
B1 , ˆ⇒ k ≥ ln(1/ˆ)
ln(1/q)
− 1. (46)
Then by invoking (30) for β > 1, we derive the following complexity bound for player i:
⌈
ln(1/ˆ)
ln(1/q)
⌉
−1∑
k=0
ji,k ≤
⌈
ln(1/ˆ)
ln(1/q)
⌉
−1∑
k=0
(
Qi
η2(k+1)
+ 1
)
=
⌈
ln(1/ˆ)
ln(1/q)
⌉∑
k=1
Qi
η2k
+
⌈
ln(1/ˆ)
ln(1/q)
⌉
≤ Qi
ln(1/η2)
η
−2
(
ln(1/ˆ)
ln(1/q)
+2
)
+
⌈
ln(1/ˆ)
ln(1/q)
⌉
,
which results in (45) by invoking (31). 2
Coordinate descent methods advocate that only a small block of variables are updated in each iteration while
others are kept fixed [53]. The blocks of variables can be updated in a cyclic, random, or greedy fashion. In Section
4, we examined randomized update schemes, whereas here we consider a cyclic update scheme to broader problem
settings, and analyze the iteration complexity.
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Corollary 3 Let Algorithm 3 be applied to the stochastic Nash game (SNash), where αi,k = ηβi,k for some
η ∈ (0, 1). Suppose that an inexact solution characterized by (38) is computed via (SAi,k). Let Assumptions
1, 4 and 5 hold. Suppose that the players are chosen to update cyclicly, and ρ = (max{a∞, η})1/(n0+1) with
n0 =
⌈
B2
N
⌉
. Define c , ρ 1N and let q ∈ (c, 1). If ˜ , C+Dρ
N−1
N with D = 1/ ln((q/c)e), η˜ = η1/N , then the
number of projected gradient steps for player i to compute an −NE∞ is no greater than
`
(2)
i (η) ,
Qi
η˜2η2 ln(1/η˜2)
(
1
˜
) ln(1/η˜2)
ln(1/q)
+
⌈
ln (1/˜)
ln(1/q)
⌉
.
Proof. For any i ∈ Ik, let ji,k =
⌈
Qi
η2+2k/N
⌉
be the steps of the SA scheme (43) computed for player i at major
iteration k. Set xi,k+1 := zi,ji,k . By the cyclic rule, we see that B1 = N , and each player i ∈ N is picked exactly
once among N steps. As a result, βi,k =
⌈
k+1
N
⌉
when i ∈ Ik, and hence βi,k ≤ kN + 1. Then by η ∈ (0, 1) and
Lemma 3, we obtain that
E
[‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yik)‖2∣∣Fk] = E [‖zi,ji,k − x̂i(yik)‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ Qiji,k ≤ η2+2k/N ≤ η2βi,k = α2i,k, ∀i ∈ Ik.
Then by similar procedure for deriving (45), we may obtain the following iteration complexity for player i:
⌈
ln(1/ˆ)
ln(1/q)
⌉
−1∑
k=0
ji,k ≤ 1
η2(N−1)/N
⌈
ln(1/ˆ)
ln(1/q)
⌉
−1∑
k=0
Qi
η˜2(k+1)
+
⌈
ln(1/ˆ)
ln(1/q)
⌉
≤ 1
η2(N−1)/N
Qi
η˜4 ln(1/η˜2)
(
1
ˆ
) ln(1/η˜2)
ln(1/q)
+
⌈
ln(1/ˆ)
ln(1/q)
⌉
.
Thus, the result follows by η˜ = η1/N and by ˆ defined in (46) with B1 = N . 2
5.4 Complexity bound
In the following theorem, we drive the upper bound for `(1)i (η) and `
(2)
i (η) defined in Theorem 3 and Corollary 3,
respectively.
Theorem 4 Set η , a∞. Then we have the following bounds on the expression `(1)i (η) and `
(2)
i (η).
a) Define n0 =
⌈
B2
B1
⌉
and n′ = B1(1 + n0). Then the following holds for any given δ > 0:
`
(1)
i (η) ≤
Qi
η4 ln(1/η2)
(
1
ˆ
)2n′+δ
+
⌈
ln
(
1
ˆ
)
2n′ + δ
2 ln(η−1)
⌉
,
where ˆ = C+Dη
− B1−1
B1(n0+1) with D defined in (48). In particular, if B1 = 1, then
`
(1)
i (η) ≤
Qi
η4 ln(1/η2)
(
C +D

)2(1+B2)+δ
+
⌈
ln
(
C +D

)
2(B2 + 1) + δ
2 ln(η−1)
⌉
,
where D = (1+B2)+2(1+B2)
2δ−1
e ln(η−1) . If D =
1+2δ−1
e ln(η−1) and B2 = 0, then given any δ > 0, we have that
`
(1)
i (η) ≤
Qi
η4 ln(1/η2)
(
C +D

)2+δ
+
⌈
ln
(
C +D

)
2 + δ
2 ln(η−1)
⌉
, (47)
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b) Given any δ > 0, ˜ , C+Dρ
N−1
N(1+n0) , n0 =
⌈
B2
N
⌉
, D given by (49), we have that
`
(2)
i (η) ≤
Qi
η2+
2
N ln(1/η
2
N )
(
1
˜
)2(n0+1)+δ
+
⌈
ln
(
1
˜
)
2(n0 + 1) + δ
2 ln(η−1)/N
⌉
.
In particular, if B2 = 0, then given any δ > 0, ˜ , C+Dρ
N−1
N and D =
N(1+2δ−1)
e ln(η−1) , we have that
`
(2)
i (η) ≤
Qi
η2+
2
N ln(1/η
2
N )
(
1
˜
)2+δ
+
⌈
ln
(
1
˜
)
(2 + δ)N
2 ln(η−1)
⌉
.
Proof. a) Define q = ceδ0/2n′ with δ0 = δ ln(η
−1)
n′+δ/2 . By η = a∞, we get ρ
1+n0 = η and c = ρ
1
B1 = η
1
n′ . Then
ln(1/q) = ln
(
η−1/n
′
e−δ0/2n
′)
=
ln(η−1)
n′
− δ0
2n′
=
2 ln(η−1)
2n′ + δ
,
ln(1/η2)
ln(1/q)
=
2 ln(η−1)
ln(1/q)
= 2n′ + δ
and D = 1/ ln((q/c)e) = 1/ ln(eδ0e/2n
′
) =
2n′
δ0e
=
n′ + 2(n′)2δ−1
e ln(η−1)
. (48)
Consequently, by the expression `(1)i (η) defined in (45), we show the first assertion of part (a). The remaining two
assertions can be easily followed by the definitions of n0, n′, and D.
b) Define q = ceδ0/2N(1+n0) with δ0 =
δ ln(η−1)
1+n0+δ/2
. By η = a∞, we get ρn0+1 = η and c = ρ
1
N = η
1
N(1+n0) .
Then by η˜ = η1/N we have the following:
ln(1/q) = ln
(
η−1/N(1+n0)e−δ0/2N(1+n0)
)
=
ln(η−1)− δ0/2
N(1 + n0)
=
2 ln(η−1)/N
2(n0 + 1) + δ
,
ln(1/η˜2)
ln(1/q)
=
ln(1/η2/N )
ln(1/q)
=
2 ln(η−1)/N
ln(1/q)
= 2(n0 + 1) + δ,
and D = 1/ ln((q/c)e) = 1/ ln(eδ0e/2N(1+n0)) =
2N(1 + n0)
δ0e
= N(1 + n0)
1 + 2(1 + n0)δ
−1
e ln(η−1)
. (49)
Then by `(2)i (η) defined in Corollary 3, we obtain the first assertion of part (b). If B2 = 0, then by definitions of
n0 and D, we get n0 = 0 and D =
N(1+2δ−1)
e ln(η−1) . Thus, the remaining assertion of part (b) holds. 2
The complexity bounds given in the part (a) and part (b) of Theorem 4 are summarized as follows:
(a)-almost cyclic rule
update frequency delay complexity bound
B1 B2 O
(
(1/)
2B1
(
1+
⌈
B2
B1
⌉)
+δ
)
1 B2 O
(
(1/)2(1+B2)+δ
)
1 0 O ((1/)2+δ)
(b)-cyclic rule
update frequency delay complexity bound
N B2 O
(
(1/)
2
(⌈
B2
N
⌉
+1
)
+δ
)
N 0 O ((1/)2+δ)
Table 2: Summary of Complexity Bounds
Remark 8 Based on established results, we make the following clarifications:
(i) If B1 = 1, B2 = 0, then the asynchronous algorithm degenerates to the synchronous algorithm. Notably, we
achieve the complexity bound O (1/2+δ) given by (47) in Theorem 4(a) compared with O (√N/)2+δ given in
Theorem 1(b). This is because the definition of -NE2 by (26) (resp. -NE∞ by (44)) as well as the analysis of
Theorem 1(b) and Theorem 4 (a) are based on two-norm and infinity norm, respectively;
(ii) Assume that the players update in a cyclic manner and B2 = 0. Then the upper bound of iteration complexity
is shown to be O (1/2+δ) in Theorem 4(b), which is of the same order as that of the synchronous case given by
(47) in Theorem 4(a).
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(iii) From Corollary 3 and Theorem 4(b) we infer that for some specific selection of update indices in each iteration,
we can get a much better upper bound than that given in Theorem 4(a). So, the update schemes of players
are critical in improving the complexity bound. Nevertheless, these findings imply that the complexity bounds
established in Theorem 4 for Algorithm 3 are optimal to some extent.
(iv) From the analysis of Algorithm 3, the geometric rate of convergence and the iteration complexity can also be
established for Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 by replacing the assumption ‖Γ‖ < 1 with ‖Γ‖∞ < 1.
Remark 9 The assumption ‖Γ‖∞ < 1 can be further weakened to ρ(Γ) < 1 based on the following: By [9,
Corollary 2.6.1], there exists a nonnegative vector w ∈ RN such that a∞ , maxi∈N 1wi
∑N
j=1 γijwj < 1. Then
by (5), we have that
diag{w}−1
 ‖x̂1(y
′)− x̂1(y)‖
...
‖x̂N (y′)− x̂N (y)‖
 ≤ diag{w}−1Γdiag{w}diag{w}−1
 ‖y
′
1 − y1‖
...
‖y′N − yN‖
 ,
where diag{w} is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal entries being wi i ∈ N . Similar to that given by the
proof [45, Proposition 5] we have the following inequality:∥∥∥∥∥∥∥diag{w}−1
 ‖x̂1(y
′)− x̂1(y)‖
...
‖x̂N (y′)− x̂N (y)‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ a∞
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥diag{w}−1
 ‖y
′
1 − y1‖
...
‖y′N − yN‖

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
,
by which we are able to establish the geometric rate of convergence and the same order complexity bound for
Algorithm 3 but with different constants.
6 Two-stage Recourse
In the previous sections, we assumed that the functions fi(x) are twice differentiable, a requirement that is essential
in deriving the contractive properties of the proximal BR map. We weaken this assumption by considering a
stochastic Nash game in the following form:
min
xi∈Xi
fi(xi, x−i) + gi(xi),
where fi(xi, x−i) , E [ψi(xi, x−i; ξ(ω))] and gi(xi) can be merely convex, possibly nonsmooth, and expectation-
valued. It is relatively simple to show that if the proximal BR map, constructed using the functions f1, . . . , fN ,
admits a contractive property, then this modified problem also admits such a property. Consequently, the only
challenge that emerges is the need to get inexact solutions to the proximal BR problem with an objective fi(x) +
gi(xi) instead of merely fi(x). In this section, we consider a two-stage recourse-based model to introduce much
needed flexibility into this framework.
Two-stage recourse-based stochastic programs originate from the work by Dantzig [15] and Beale [7] in the
50s. In the first stage, the decision-maker makes a decision prior to the revelation of the uncertainty, while in the
second-stage, a scenario-specific decision is made contingent on the first-stage decision and on the realization of
uncertainty. This second-stage decision is referred to as a recourse decision, which originates from the notion
that in the second-stage, the decision-maker takes recourse based on the realization of uncertainty and on the first-
stage decision. The expected cost of second-stage decisions is incorporated into the first-stage problem through
the recourse function. This model has tremendous utility and finds applicability in financial planning, inventory
control, power systems operation, etc (cf. [10, 51]). Nevertheless, such models and algorithms are not designed to
accommodate multiple decision makers who do not cooperate in a multi-agent system. Recently, in [37], the au-
thors consider two-stage non-cooperative games, where each agent is risk-averse and solves a rival-parameterized
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stochastic program with quadratic recourse. To handle the nonsmooth recourse functions, the authors propose
smoothing schemes leading to differentiable approximations, then design an iterative BR scheme for the smoothed
problem and show its convergence. We propose a different avenue that leverages stochastic approximation and
allows for deriving rate and complexity statements, that are unavailable in [37]. Next, we incorporate two-stage
linear and quadratic recourse into this framework and derive iteration complexity statements for the proposed BR
schemes.
6.1 Linear recourse
Consider the following two-stage stochastic Nash game:
min
xi∈Xi
E [ψi(xi, x−i; ξ(ω)] + ci(xi) + E[Qi(xi, ω)], (SNashrec(x−i))
where ci(xi) is the continuously differentiable convex cost of the first-stage decision xi and
Qi(xi, ω) , min
qi,ω
{
dTi,ωqi,ω | Ti,ωxi +Wiqi,ω = hi,ω, qi,ω ≥ 0
}
. (RecLP(xi))
The function Qi(xi, ω), being the cost of taking recourse given decision xi and scenario ω, is shown to be convex
in xi ∈ Xi for any given ω ∈ Ω (See [51, Proposition 2.1]).
Given a strategy y ∈ X , player i can compute a proximal BR x̂i(y) by solving the following stochastic
optimization problem
x̂i(y) , argmin
xi∈Xi
[
E[ψi(xi, y−i;ω)] + ci(xi) + E[Qi(xi, ω)] + µ
2
‖xi − yi‖2
]
. (50)
It is easily seen that x̂(·) defined by (50) is a contractive map since gi(xi) := ci(xi) + E[Qi(xi, ω)] is convex. We
can also use Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 to find the Nash equilibrium of the problem (SNashrec(x−i)) but with x̂i(•)
defined by (50) instead of (2). We intend to use the SG method to obtain an inexact proximal BR solution. So,
we impose the following condition on the problem (RecLP(xi)) to guarantee the existence and boundedness of the
stochastic subgradient for function E [Qi(xi, ω)].
Assumption 6 For almost all ω ∈ Ω and all xi ∈ Xi,
a) there exists a strictly positive vector qi,ω such that Ti,ωxi +Wiqi,ω = hi,ω,
b) for any vi,ω ≥ 0 with Wivi,ω = 0, it holds that dTi,ωvi,ω ≥ 0,
c) E[‖Ti,ω‖] <∞ for all i ∈ N .
We adapt the following result from [51] to analyze the subgradient of Q(xi, ω).
Lemma 9 Let Assumption 6 hold. Then for almost all ω ∈ Ω and all xi ∈ Xi,
(i) Qi(xi, ω) is finite and its subdifferential at xi is given by
∂xiQi(xi, ω) = −T Ti,ωDi(xi, ω), where Di(xi, ω) , argmax
pii,ω :WTi pii,ω≤di,ω
(hi,ω − Ti,ωxi)Tpii,ω; (51)
(ii) Di(xi, ω) defined by (51) is bounded;
(iii) there exists a positive constant Ms > 0 such that
E[‖si‖2] ≤M2s , ∀si ∈ ∂Qi(xi, ω). (52)
Proof. (i) Assumption 6(a) implies the existence of a feasible solution to problem (RecLP(xi)). Then by Assump-
tion 6(b), we see that for almost all ω ∈ Ω and all xi ∈ Xi, (RecLP(xi)) has an optimal solution and Qi(xi, ω) is
finite. Thus, by [51, Proposition 2.2] we obtain the result.
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(ii) Note that hi,ω−Ti,ωxi is an interior point of the positive hull of matrixWi by Assumption 6(a). It is shown
in [51, p. 29] that the optimal solution set Di(xi, ω) of (51) is bounded.
(iii) By Assumption 6(c) and the boundedness of Di(xi, ω) we have the result. 2
Since Qi(xi, ω) is subdifferentiable, the following SA scheme is utilized to approximate the proximal BR
x̂i(yk):
zi,t+1 := ΠXi
[
zi,t − γt
(∇ici(zi,t) +∇xiψi(zi,t, y−i,k; ξti,k) + µ(zi,t − yi,k) + si,t)] , (SAreci,k )
where zi,1 = xi,k, γt = 1/µ(t + 1) and si,t ∈ ∂Qi(zi,t, ωti,k). In fact, the SA scheme (SAreci,k ) requires a solution
of the second-stage dual problem (51) to obtain a stochastic subgradient. Since ∇ici(·) is continuous and Xi is
compact, there exists Mc > 0 such that ‖∇ici(xi)‖ ≤ Mc ∀xi ∈ Xi. Combined with Assumption 1(d), (16) and
(52) yields that for any xi ∈ Xi, y ∈ X
E
[‖∇ici(xi) +∇xiψi(xi, x−i; ξ) + µ(xi − yi) + si||2] ≤ 4(M2i +M2s +M2c + µ2D2Xi).
By [51, Theorem 7.47], under suitable regularity conditions, it is seen that E [∂Qi(xi, ω)] = ∂E [Qi(xi, ω)], and
hence si,t ∈ ∂Qi(zi,t, ωti,k) is an unbiased estimate for some subgradient of E [Qi(xi, ω)] at point zi,t.
Consequently, Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 are applicable to the stochastic Nash game with linear-recourse. Further,
the convergence results all hold for the problem (SNashrec(x−i)) with Qi(xi, ω) defined by (RecLP(xi)), except
that the constant Qi , 2M
2
i
µ2
+ 2D2Xi is replaced by Qi ,
4(M2s+M
2
c+M
2
i )
µ2
+ 4D2Xi .
6.2 Quadratic recourse
In the past, two-stage stochastic quadratic programs with fixed recourse have been considered in [13, 43], where
the first-stage term is a quadratic function and the second-stage term is the expectation of the minimum value of a
quadratic program. In [43] and [13], the authors work with the recourse subproblems’ dual that is approximated
by a sequence of quadratic program subproblems, and propose a Lagrangian finite generation technique and a
Newton’s method to solve the problem, respectively. In [29, 48], Dorn duality is employed in developing a Ben-
ders scheme. Motivated by this, we incorporate quadratic recourse in the stochastic Nash game and consider the
two-stage problem (SNashrec(x−i)), for which ci(xi) is a continuously differentiable convex cost of xi, and the
recourse function Qi(xi, ω) is the optimal value of a convex quadratic program parameterized by the decision xi
and scenario ω:
min
qi,ω
{
dTi,ωqi,ω +
1
2
qi,ω
THi,ωqi,ω | qi,ω ∈ Υi,ω , {qi,ω ≥ 0 : Ti,ωxi +Wiqi,ω = hi,ω}
}
, (RecQP(xi))
where Hi,ω is a symmetric positive semidefinite matrix. By Dorn duality [16], a dual problem to (RecQP(xi)) has
the following form:
max
ui,ω ,pii,ω
φi(xi, ui,ω, pii,ω) , (hi,ω − Ti,ωxi)Tpii,ω − 1
2
uTi,ωHi,ωui,ω
subject to (ui,ω, pii,ω) ∈ Si,ω , {ui,ω, pii,ω : W Ti pii,ω −Hi,ωui,ω ≤ di,ω}.
(53)
Assumption 7 For any xi ∈ Xi and almost all ω ∈ Ω,
a) there exists a strictly positive vector qi,ω such that Ti,ωxi +Wiqi,ω = hi,ω;
b) for any qi,ω ∈ Υi,ω, vi,ω ≥ 0 with Wivi,ω = 0, vTi,ωHi,ωvi,ω = 0, it holds that (Hi,ωqi,ω + di,ω)T vi,ω ≥ 0;
c) E[‖Ti,ω‖] <∞ for all i ∈ N .
Before proceeding to show the finiteness of Qi(xi, ω), we first provide a lemma concerning the existence of
optimal solutions for quadratic programs. Consider a quadratic program in the following form:
min
x∈Rn
{
1
2
xTDx+ cTx | x ∈ ∆(A, b) , {x ≥ 0 : Ax = b}
}
, (54)
where D ∈ Rn×n is positive semidefinite. Then by [30, Corollary 2.6], we have the following lemma.
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Lemma 10 The problem (54) has a solution if and only if ∆(A, b) is nonempty and the following condition is
satisfied:
If x, v ∈ Rn are such that x ∈ ∆(A,b), v ≥ 0,Av = 0, and vTDv = 0, then (Dx + c)Tv ≥ 0.
Before providing the result, we state a simple result about the quadratic programming which may be proved directly
or by invoking [20, Cor. 2.3.7].
Lemma 11 Assume that problem (54) has a solution set S∗. Then the set DS∗ contains a singleton.
We now analyze the subdifferential of the recourse function.
Lemma 12 Let Assumption 7 hold. Then we may claim the following:
(a) The optimal solution set Sopti,ω (xi) of the dual problem (53) is nonempty, andQi(xi, ω) = max
(ui,ω ,pii,ω)∈Si,ω
φi(xi, ui,ω, pii,ω).
Additionally, Di(xi, ω) =
{
piopti,ω (xi) :
(
uopti,ω (xi), pi
opt
i,ω (xi)
)
∈ Sopti,ω (xi)
}
is a bounded set;
(b) Qi(xi, ω) is convex in xi ∈ Xi for any given ω ∈ Ω;
(c) Qi(xi, ω) is subdifferentiable at xi with ∂xiQi(xi, ω) = −T Ti,ωDi(xi, ω). In particular, if Di(xi, ω) consists of
a unique point piopti,ω (xi), then Qi(xi, ω) is differentiable at xi with∇xiQi(xi, ω) = −T Ti,ωpiopti,ω (xi);
(d) there exists a positive constant Ms > 0 such that E[‖si‖2] ≤M2s ∀si ∈ ∂Qi(xi, ω).
Proof. (a) By invoking Assumption 7 together with Lemma 10, we have that Qi(xi, ω) defined by problem
(RecQP(xi)) has at least one optimal solution q∗i,ω. Note that
Ti,ωxi +Wiqi,ω = hi,ω ⇔
(
Wi
−Wi
)
qi,ω ≥
(
hi,ω − Ti,ωxi
− (hi,ω − Ti,ωxi)
)
.
Then by [16, Theorem (Dual)-i] it is easily seen that a solution
(
uopti,ω (xi), pi
opt
i,ω (xi)
)
=
(
q∗i,ω, pi
opt
i,ω (xi)
)
exists to
the dual problem (53) and Qi(xi, ω) = max(ui,ω ,pii,ω)∈Si,ω φi(xi, ui,ω, pii,ω).
By [16, Theorem (Dual)-ii] we see that for any
(
uopti,ω (xi), pi
opt
i,ω (xi)
)
∈ Sopti,ω (xi), a solution q∗i,ω satisfying
Hi,ωq
∗
i,ω = Hi,ωu
opt
i,ω (xi) to problem (RecQP(xi)) also exists. We denote by O
opt
i,ω the optimal solution set of
problem (RecQP(xi)). Then by Lemma 11, the set Hi,ωO
opt
i,ω contains a singleton denoted by Hi,ωq
∗
i,ω. Thus, for
any
(
uopti,ω (xi), pi
opt
i,ω (xi)
)
∈ Sopti,ω (xi), Hi,ωuopti,ω (xi) equals Hi,ωq∗i,ω. As a result, by the optimality condition for
problem (53) we see that for any
(
uopti,ω (xi), pi
opt
i,ω (xi)
)
∈ Sopti,ω (xi), piopti,ω (xi) is a solution of the following linear
program
max
pii,ω
{
(hi,ω − Ti,ωxi)Tpii,ω |W Ti pii,ω ≤ Hi,ωq∗i,ω + di,ω
}
. (55)
Note that since hi,ω −Ti,ωxi is an interior point of the positive hull of matrix Wi by Assumption 7(a), from [51, p.
29], the optimal solution set of problem (55) must be bounded. Hence Di(xi, ω) is bounded.
(b) Since φi(xi, ui,ω, pii,ω) is convex in xi for all (ui,ω, pii,ω) ∈ Si,ω, for any α ∈ [0, 1] and any xi, x′i ∈ Xi
φi(αxi + (1− α)x′i, ui,ω, pii,ω) ≤ αφi(xi, ui,ω, pii,ω) + (1− α)φi(x′i, ui,ω, pii,ω)
≤ αQi(xi, ω) + (1− α)Qi(x′i, ω),
where the last inequality follows from part (a). Taking the maximum with respect to (ui,ω, pii,ω) ∈ Si,ω we obtain
Qi(αxi + (1− α)x′i, ω) ≤ αQi(xi, ω) + (1− α)Qi(x′i, ω), and hence the recourse function Qi(xi, ω) is convex
in xi ∈ Xi for every ω ∈ Ω.
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(c) Note that ∂φi(xi,ui,ω ,pii,ω)∂xi = −T Ti,ωpii,ω. Since Di(xi, ω) is a compact convex set, by the proof of Danskin’s
theorem [8, Proposition A.22] we obtain
∂Qi(xi, ω) = conv{−T Ti,ωui,ω : (ui,ω, pii,ω) ∈ Sopti,ω (xi)}
= conv{−T Ti,ωui,ω : ui,ω ∈ Di(xi, ω)} = −T Ti,ωDi(xi, ω).
Hence the result follows.
(d) By Assumption 7(c) and the boundedness of Di(xi, ω) we achieve the result. 2
From Lemma 12(b), gi(xi) := ci(xi) + E[Qi(xi, ω)] is convex. Then by recalling the fact that f1, · · · , fN
admit a contractive property, x̂(·) defined by (50) is a contractive map. As a result, the algorithm and convergence
results shown in Section 6.1 for the problem (SNashrec(x−i)) with Qi(xi, ω) defined by (RecLP(xi)) still carry
over to the problem (SNashrec(x−i)) with Qi(xi, ω) defined by (Recquar(xi)).
7 Numerics
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of the proposed algorithms through an asset management problem
and a two-stage capacity expansion game. In Section 7.1, we formulate a portfolio investment problem and detailed
descriptions of our simulations are provided in Section 7.2. In Section 7.3, we formulate a two-stage competitive
capacity expansion problem and provide numerical simulations for the synchronous algorithm.
7.1 Competitive portfolio selection
The portfolio selection problem has a long history in the field of modern financial theory, dating back to the
seminal work of Markowitz [32]. We consider the case with N investors where investor i ∈ N = {1, · · · , N}
may invest an amount xij in asset j ∈ {1, · · · , n}. Suppose that asset j = 1, · · · , n has a return rate rj , a
random variable with expectation νj = E[rj ]. Denote by R = E[(r − ν)(r − ν)T ] ∈ Rn×n the covariance
matrix, where r = (r1, · · · , rn)T ∈ Rn and ν = (ν1, · · · , νn)T ∈ Rn. Then for investor i ∈ N , the expected
return is
∑n
j=1 νjxij = ν
Txi, while the variance (risk) of the return is E[
(
rTxi − νTxi
)2
] = xTi Rxi, where
xi = (xi1, · · · , xin)T ∈ Rn. The expected return and variance of each asset i can be estimated from the history.
We consider a setting where each investor trades off between return and risk through the following utility: Ui(xi) ,
ρix
T
i Rxi−νTxi, where ρi > 0 is the risk-aversion parameter of investor i, and larger ρi results in a larger emphasis
on risk.
In a practical market incorporating multiple investors, trades of diverse investors are usually pooled and ex-
ecuted together [35, 54]. The transaction cost for a single investor may depend on the overall trading levels in
the market and not just its own trading. Each investor i has an initial holding x0i , the transaction price is a func-
tion of trade size xj − x0j ∀j ∈ N from all investors, e.g., the price takes the form φ(ω)
∑N
i=1(xi − x0i ), where
φ : Ω → Rn×n is a diagonal random matrix with diagonal entries being positive. Besides, the transaction cost of
each investor is proportional to its trade size. Based on the above considerations, the portfolio selection problem
of investor i can be modeled as the following stochastic program:
min
xi∈Xi
fi(xi, x−i) = Ui(xi) + E
(xi − x0i )Tφ(ω) N∑
j=1
(xj − x0j )
 , (56)
where Xi denotes the set of feasible portfolios of player i. Denote by Φ , E[φ(ω)]. Then for any i ∈ N ,
∇2xifi(x) = 2ρiR+ 2Φ, ∇2xixjfi(x) = Φ ∀j 6= i.
Assume that the parameters ρi, R,Φ satisfy the following condition
λmin(2ρiR+ 2Φ) > (N − 1)‖Φ‖ ∀i ∈ N . (57)
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If condition (57) holds, then ‖Γ‖∞ < 1. Since both R and Φ are symmetric and positive definite matrices, all of
their eigenvalues are strictly positive. Then for sufficiently large ρi, condition (57) certainly holds. Notably, large
ρi means that investor i is more risk-averse.
7.2 Numerical results
We consider a market of 6 investors and 4 assets, i.e., N = 6, n = 4. Set ν = (0.5, 0.35, 0.4, 0.3) and let R be
a diagonal matrix with R11 = 0.16, R22 = 0.1, R33 = 0.12, R44 = 0.09. Let each diagonal element of φ(ω) be
a random variable satisfying a uniform distribution [0.12, 0.18], and hence Φ = 0.15I4. Set ρi = 3 + i/N . Let
Xi = {xi ∈ Rn : xij ≥ 0, xij ≤ capij , j = 1, · · · , n}. We set capij = 0.5 and the initial holdings x0ij = 0
for all i ∈ N and j = 1, · · · , n. Then Assumptions 1, 2 and 5 hold. Throughout this section, we assume that the
empirical mean of the error is calculated by averaging across 50 trajectories.
7.2.1 Convergence of the Synchronous Algorithm
We now present simulations for Algorithm 1 and examine its empirical convergence rate and iteration complexity.
Suppose ji,k =
⌈
1
η2k
⌉
steps of (SAi,k) are taken at major iteration k to get an inexact solution to (7), where
η = aκ/2 for some κ > 0. Then αi,k ≤ ηk by Lemma 3, and hence the sequence {αi,k} is summable by noting
that η ∈ (0, 1). We carry out simulations for different selections of µ, κ, for each case the smallest number of
projected SG steps each player has carried out to obtain uk ≤ 2.5e-03 is listed in Table 3, where uk is defined in
(18). From this table, it is seen that the parameters µ, κ play an important rule in the overall iteration complexity.
µ
κ
0.8 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6
0.75 10240 7694 5908 5076 4125 4176 3237 2941
1 8354 5684 4351 4192 3018 2428 2782 2740
1.25 7266 5117 4051 3068 3010 2724 1876 2635
1.5 6178 4325 3407 2862 2501 1910 1813 1928
1.75 6168 4173 2993 2732 2178 1783 1784 1514
2 5572 3765 2709 2652 2300 2054 1769 1594
2.25 5153 3477 2774 2608 2090 1956 1455 1339
2.5 4637 3755 2848 2582 1692 1609 1491 1433
Table 3: Empirical iteration complexity for the synchronous algorithm with different µ and η
The rate of convergence of uk is shown in Figure 1, which demonstrates that the iterates converge in mean
to the unique equilibrium at a linear rate. We further examine the convergence behavior of Algorithm 1 with
µ = 2, η = a by plotting the error bar of x11,k, where the blue line denotes the trajectory of the mean sequence
computed via the sample average, the black dashed line denotes the equilibrium strategy x∗11, while the red bars
capture the variance of x11,k. Figure 2 shows that the equilibrium estimate approaches zero both with probability
one and in mean with the variance across the samples decaying to zero. This corresponds well with the theoretical
findings that the iterates converge a.s. to the NE and that the variance converges to zero by Proposition 2 and
Proposition 3(b), respectively. The empirical relation between  andK() is shown in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), where
K() denotes the smallest number of projected SG steps the player has carried out to make uk < . The red solid
curve represents the empirical data, while the blue dashed curve demonstrates the corresponding quadratic fit,
which aligns well with the empirical data. It indicates that the empirical iteration complexity is of order (1/2) in
this simulation setting.
While the previous numerical simulations are all for summable inexactness sequence {αi,k}, we now inves-
tigate the performance for non-summable {αi,k}. Let µ = 2 and suppose ji,k = k2 steps of (SAi,k) are taken
at major iteration k to get an inexact solution to (7). Then αi,k = 1/k by Lemma 3, and hence {αi,k} is not
summable. We plot the error bar of x11,k in Figure 3, where the blue line denotes the trajectory of the mean se-
quence, the black dashed line denotes the equilibrium strategy x∗11, and the red bars denotes the variance of x11,k.
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Figure 1: Linear Convergence of
Synchronous Algorithm
Figure 2: Almost Sure Conver-
gence of Synchronous Algorithm
with Summable {αi,k}
Figure 3: Almost Sure Conver-
gence of Synchronous Algorithm
with Unsummable {αi,k}
It shows that the variance across the samples decays to zero, which is consistent with Proposition 3(b) by noting
that αi,k → 0. Figure 3 also displays that the estimates appear to converge a.s. to the NE though we cannot
theoretically claim this from Proposition 2 since
∑∞
k=1 αi,k = ∞. Further, the empirical relation between  and
K() is shown in Figure 4(c) with the red solid curve representing the empirical data and the blue dashed curve
demonstrating its quadratic fit. It is easily seen that the complexity bound of non-summable {αi,k} is worse than
that of summable {αi,k} as shown in Figure 4.
(a) Summable αi,k (b) Summable αi,k (c) Non-summable αi,k
Figure 4: Empirical Iteration Complexity and Quadratic Fitting of Synchronous Algorithm
Comparisons with stochastic gradient method: Set µ = 2.5 and suppose ji,k =
⌈
1
a3k
⌉
steps of (SAi,k) are taken
at major iteration k to get an inexact solution to (7). We compare both Algorithm 1 and the standard SG method
for computing an NE in terms of the iteration complexity and communication overhead for achieving the same
accuracy. The empirically observed relationship between  and K() for both methods are shown in Figure 5.
From the figure, it can be observed that the iteration complexity are of the same orders while the constant of the
SG method is superior to that of Algorithm 1. Note that in the delay-free SG method, each player performs a single
projected gradient step by invoking a communication with its rivals, consequently, the resulting communication
overhead is proportional to the total number of projected gradient steps. In contrast, the synchronous inexact
proximal algorithm carries out an increasing number of player-specific projected gradient steps after a single
round of communication with its rivals. Note that this communication overhead is expected to be less in stochastic
gradient schemes with delay [2]. The communication overhead of the SG method and Algorithm 1 is compared
in Figure 6. From the results demonstrated in Figure 5 and Figure 6, we conclude that Algorithm 1 compares
well with the SG method in terms of overall projected gradient steps while showing markedly less communication
overhead. In fact, in certain applications, high communication overhead tends to render a scheme impractical.
28
Figure 5: Comparison of Iteration
Complexity
Figure 6: Comparison of Com-
munication Overhead
Figure 7: Linear Convergence of
Randomized Algorithm
7.2.2 Convergence of the Randomized and Asynchronous Schemes
We now run simulations for Algorithm 2, where pi = 1/N ∀i ∈ N . Suppose ji,k =
⌈
1
η
2(βi,k+1)
⌉
steps of (SAi,k)
are taken at major iteration k to get an inexact solution satisfying (33), where η = aκ/2 for some κ > 0. The
trajectories of uk are shown in Figure 7, while the empirical mean of the number of projected SG steps is dis-
played in Figure 8. It is seen that randomized algorithm still displays linear convergence but its empirical iteration
complexity of randomized algorithm is larger than that of the synchronous algorithm, a less surprising observation.
Figure 8: Iteration Complexity of
Randomized Algorithm
Figure 9: Linear Convergence of
Asynchronous Algorithm
Figure 10: Iteration Complexity
of Asynchronous Algorithm
Next, we simulate the performance of Algorithm 3, where for any k ≥ 0, i ∈ Ik, j ∈ N , the communication
delays τij(k) are independently generated from a uniform distribution on the set {0, 1, · · · , B2}. Set µ = 2, η =
a∞, B1 = 1. Suppose that ji,k =
⌈
1
η2k
⌉
steps of (43) are taken at major iteration k to get an inexact solution to
problem (38). We carry out simulations for different communication delaysB2 = 0, 4, 8, 12. The trajectories of uk
are shown in Figure 9, from which it is observed that the iterates produced by Algorithm 3 converge in mean to the
unique equilibrium at a linear rate; however, the trajectories tend to display less of the monotonically decreasing
behavior that characterizes the synchronous schemes. The empirically observed iteration complexity is plotted in
Figure 10 and we note that this worsens as B2 grows.
7.2.3 Comparisons of Empirical and Theoretical Results
Set ρi = 4 ∀i ∈ N . Let each player take 40 BR steps and the inexact proximal BR solution be computed via a
SA scheme. The theoretical and empirical rate of convergence are shown in Table 4, from which it is seen that the
theoretical error bound is relatively conservative while the empirical error is seen to be far smaller in practice.
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parameters synchronous randomized asynchronousempirical theoretical empirical theoretical empirical theoretical
µ = 1
η = a0.5 2e-03 1.89 2.64e-03 1.98e+01 1.43e-03 1.36e+01
η = a0.75 4.76e-04 7.18e-01 7.42e-04 1.73e+01 3.24e-04 1.36e+01
η = a 1.08e-04 3.18e-01 2.27e-04 1.53e+01 7.94e-05 1.37e+01
µ = 2
η = a0.5 6.1e-03 6.98e+00 7.88e-03 2.49e+01 4.33e-03 3.69e+01
η = a0.75 2.26e-03 3.89e+00 3.3e-03 2.27e+01 1.72e-03 3.69e+01
η = a 9.39e-04 2.33e+00 1.39e-03 2.09e+01 6.9e-04 3.69e+01
µ = 5
η = a0.5 1.3e-02 2.6e+01 2.06e-02 3.16e+01 1.11e-02 9.62e+01
η = a0.75 7.5e-03 2.01e+01 1.24e-02 3.01e+01 6.55e-03 9.62e+01
η = a 4.8e-03 1.58e+01 8.4e-03 2.89e+01 4.2e-03 9.62e+01
Table 4: Comparison of theoretical and empirical error
7.3 Two-stage stochastic Nash games.
Consider a set of N players denoted by N , {1, · · · , N}, where the i-th player solves the following two-stage
problem
min
xi:0≤xi≤capi
Ci(xi)− P (x)xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
,fi(xi,x−i)
+E[Qi(xi, ω)], where Qi(xi, ω) , max
qi,ω :0≤qi,ω≤xi
di,ωqi,ω − hi,ω
2
q2i,ω. (58)
where P (x) = a − b∑Ni=1 xi, Ci(·) is a twice continuously differentiable and ηi-strongly convex function of
xi. This can be viewed as a game where N firms compete in Cournot in a capacity market defined by an inverse
demand function P (x) and subsequently make production decisions subject to a demand’s capacity constraints
while faced by random prices and costs, where P (x), the market price, is a decreasing function of total production,
and Ci(xi) is the cost function of firm i. Capacity markets are utilized to price generation capacity in power
markets [1, 18]. Note that
52f =
 5
2
11f · · · 521Nf
...
. . .
...
52N1f · · · 52NNf
 =
 5
2
11C1
. . .
52NNCN
+ b (IN + 1N1TN) .
Since Ci(·) is a twice continuously differentiable and ηi-strongly convex function of xi, by definition (4) we have
that for any i ∈ N , ζi,min = ηi + 2b and ζij,max = b ∀j 6= i. Then by (3) the following holds:
Γ =

µ
µ+η1+2b
b
µ+η1+2b
. . . bµ+η1+2b
b
µ+η2+2b
µ
µ+η2+2b
. . . bµ+η2+2b
...
. . .
b
µ+ηN+2b
b
µ+ηN+2b
. . . µµ+ηN+2b

Since for any i ∈ N and for any given ω, the function Qi(·, ω) is convex. Then Qi(·) is convex in xi, and hence
x̂(•) is contractive when the spectral radius ρ(Γ) < 1, for which one of the sufficient conditions is ‖Γ‖∞ < 1. As
such, the assumption min
i∈N
ηi > (N − 3)b ensure that the proximal BR map is contractive.
By Dorn duality [16], a dual problem to the second stage problem (58) is as follows:
min
ui,ω ,vi,ω
{
φi(xi, ui,ω, vi,ω) =
hi,ω
2
u2i,ω + xivi,ω | hi,ωui,ω + vi,ω ≥ di,ω, vi,ω ≥ 0
}
. (59)
Similar to Lemma 12, we can also show that the optimal solution set Sopti,ω (xi) of (59) is bounded. Note that
∂φi(xi,ui,ω ,pii,ω)
∂xi
= vi,ω, by invoking Danskin’s theorem, we obtain that ∂Qi(xi, ω) = conv{vi,ω : (ui,ω, vi,ω) ∈
Sopti,ω (xi)}. In the simulations, we set N = 5, µ = 1, a = 2, b = 0.5, capi = 0.3 + 0.1
√
i, and ηi = (N − 2.5)b.
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Suppose Ci(xi) =
ηix
2
i
2 . Let hi,ω and di,ω be random variables satisfying the uniform distributions [0.45, 0.55]
and [0.3, 0.4], respectively. We now present simulations for the synchronous algorithm and examine its empirical
convergence rate and iteration complexity, where the empirical results are obtained by averaging across 50 tra-
jectories. Suppose ji,k =
⌈
1
ak
⌉
steps of (SAreci,k ) are taken at major iteration k to get an inexact solution to (7).
The rate of convergence of uk is shown in Figure 11, which demonstrates that the iterates converge in mean to the
unique equilibrium at a linear rate. The empirical relation between  and K() is shown in Figure 12, from which
it is seen that the empirical data aligns well with the corresponding quadratic fit. It demonstrates that the empirical
iteration complexity is still of order O(1/2) in the settings of a two-stage stochastic Nash game.
Figure 11: Linear Convergence Figure 12: Iteration Complexity
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper considers a class of Nash games where each player’s payoff function is expectation-valued. We propose
a synchronous inexact proximal BR scheme to solve the problem as well as a randomized and an asynchronous
variant. Under suitable contractive properties on the proximal BR map, we separately prove that all proposed
schemes produce iterates that converge in mean to the unique equilibrium at a linear rate. In addition, we derive
the overall iteration complexity for computing an -Nash equilibrium in terms of projected gradient steps. Further-
more, we consider generalizations that allow for private recourse by allowing for each player to solve a two-stage
stochastic Nash game with either linear or quadratic second-stage problems. Finally, preliminary numerical studies
support the theoretical findings in terms of asymptotic behavior and rate statements.
A Proof of Lemma 4
Define ti,k , xi,k + χi,k(x̂i(xk) − xi,k), and ei,k , χi,k (xi,k+1 − x̂i(xk)). Then xi,k+1 = ti,k + ei,k. By
Assumption 3, we have that
E
[‖ti,k − x∗i ‖2∣∣Fk] = (1− pi)‖xi,k − x∗i ‖2 + pi‖x̂i(xk)− x∗i ‖2. (A.1)
For x = {xi}Ni=1 ∈ X and P = diag
{
1
p1
⊗ In1 , · · · , 1pN ⊗ InN
}
, we define the weighted norm
‖x‖2P = xTPx =
N∑
i=1
‖xi‖2/pi. (A.2)
Then by denoting tk = {ti,k}Ni=1, from (A.1) and (A.2) it follows that
E
[‖tk − x∗‖2P ∣∣Fk] = N∑
i=1
1
pi
E
[‖ti,k − x∗i ‖2∣∣Fk] = ‖xk − x∗‖2P + N∑
i=1
‖x̂i(xk)− x∗i ‖2 −
N∑
i=1
‖xi,k − x∗i ‖2
≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2P − (1− a2) ‖xk − x∗‖2, (A.3)
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where the last inequality follows by x̂(x∗) = x∗ and the inequality (9). By (33) and Assumption 3, we see that for
any i ∈ N
E
[‖ei,k‖2∣∣Fk] = piE [‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(xk)‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ piα2i,k a.s. (A.4)
Then by the definition (A.2), we obtain the following:
E
[‖ek‖2P ∣∣Fk] ≤ N∑
i=1
α2i,k a.s. (A.5)
Note that by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, ‖xi,k+1−x∗i ‖2 ≤ ‖ti,k−x∗i ‖2 + ‖ei,k‖2 + 2‖ti,k−x∗i ‖‖ei,k‖. Then
by taking expectations conditioned on Fk, and by the condition Jensen’s inequality, we have that
E
[‖xi,k+1 − x∗i ‖2∣∣Fk] ≤ E [‖ti,k − x∗i ‖2∣∣Fk]+ E [‖ei,k‖2∣∣Fk]+ 2√E [‖ti,k − x∗i ‖2∣∣Fk]E [‖ei,k‖2∣∣Fk].
Since ti,k ∈ Xi, by (16) and invoking the definition of weighted norm (A.2) we have that
E
[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2P ∣∣Fk] ≤ E [‖tk − x∗‖2P ∣∣Fk]+ E [‖ek‖2P ∣∣Fk]+ 2 N∑
i=1
DXi
pi
√
E
[‖ei,k‖2∣∣Fk]
≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2P − (1− a2) ‖xk − x∗‖2 +
N∑
i=1
α2i,k + 2
N∑
i=1
DXi√
pi
αi,k,
(A.6)
where the last inequality is derived by (A.3), (A.4), and (A.5). Since 0 ≤ αi,k < 1 and
∑∞
k=0 αi,k < ∞ a.s.,
we have that
∑∞
k=0 α
2
i,k < ∞ a.s. Then by the Robbins-Siegmund theorem ( [42, Theorem 1]), ‖xk − x∗‖2P
converges almost surely and
∑∞
k=0(1 − a2) ‖xk − x∗‖2 < ∞ a.s. Consequently, ‖xk − x∗‖2 converges to zero
almost surely, and hence we obtain the result. 2
B Proof of Lemma 5
Note that ‖xk−x∗‖2 ≥ pmin
∑N
i=1 ‖xi,k−x∗i ‖2/pi = pmin‖xk−x∗‖2P , where pmin = mini∈N pi. Then by (A.3),
we get
E
[‖tk − x∗‖2P ∣∣Fk] ≤ (1− pmin(1− a2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
,a˜2
‖xk − x∗‖2P a.s, (B.1)
and hence by the conditional Jensen’s inequality, we obtain the following bound: E
[‖tk − x∗‖P ∣∣Fk] ≤ a˜‖xk −
x∗‖P a.s. Then by invoking that xk+1 = tk + ek, the triangle inequality and Jensen’s inequality, we have that
E [‖xk+1 − x∗‖P ] ≤ E [‖tk − x∗‖P ] + E [‖ek‖P ] ≤ a˜E [‖xk − x∗‖P ] +
√
E
[‖ek‖2P ]. (B.2)
Since P(βi,k = m) =
(
k
m
)
pmi (1− pi)k−m for all k ≥ 1. Then for any k ≥ 1,
E[η2βi,k ] =
k∑
m=0
η2mP(βi,k = m) =
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
pmi (1− pi)k−mη2m
=
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
(piη
2)m(1− pi)k−m = (piη2 + 1− pi)k
= (1− pi(1− η2))k ≤ (1− pmin(1− η2))k , η˜2k ∀i ∈ N .
(B.3)
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Then by βi,0 = 0 and αi,k = ηβi,k+1, we obtain E[α2i,k] ≤ η2η˜2k ∀k ≥ 0, and hence by (A.5) we have that
E
[‖ek‖2P ] ≤ N∑
i=1
E
[
α2i,k
] ≤ Nη2η˜2k ∀k ≥ 0.
Thus, by (B.2), we have the following inequality for any k ≥ 1:
E [‖xk − x∗‖P ] ≤ a˜E [‖xk−1 − x∗‖P ] +
√
Nηη˜−1η˜k.
≤ a˜k|||x0 − x∗|||+
√
Nηη˜−1
k∑
j=1
a˜k−j η˜j ≤ C
(
N∑
i=1
p−1i
)1/2
c˜k +
√
Nηη˜−1kc˜k,
where c˜ , max{a˜, η˜}. Then by Lemma 2, we have that
E [‖xk − x∗‖P ] ≤ C
(
N∑
i=1
p−1i
)1/2
q˜k +
√
Nηη˜−1Dq˜k ≤
√
N(C˜ + D˜)q˜k,
where q˜ > c˜, D , 1/ ln((q˜/c˜)e), C˜ , C
(∑N
i=1N
−1p−1i
)1/2
, and D˜ , Dηη˜−1. 2
C Proof of Lemma 7.
For any i ∈ Ik, by the triangle inequality we have that
‖xi,k+1 − x∗i ‖ ≤ ‖xi,k+1 − x̂i(yik)‖+ ‖x̂i(yik)− x̂i(x∗)‖.
Then by taking expectations conditioned on Fk, by (38) and the conditional Jensen’s inequality, we obtain:
E
[‖xi,k+1 − x∗i ‖∣∣Fk] ≤ αi,k + E [‖x̂i(yik)− x̂i(x∗)‖∣∣Fk] a.s. (C.1)
Since αi,k is deterministic by Assumption 4(a), by taking unconditional expectations on both sides of (C.1), and
by invoking yik = (x1,k−τi1(k), · · · , xN,k−τiN (k)) and (40), we have that for any i ∈ Ik:
E[‖xi,k+1 − x∗i ‖] ≤ αi,k + a∞max
j∈N
E[‖xj,k−τij(k) − x∗j‖]. (C.2)
We now prove inequality (41) by induction. It is obvious that (41) holds for k = 0 by E[‖xi,0 − x∗i ‖] ≤ C for all
i ∈ N . Inductively, we assume that (41) holds for all k up to some nonnegative integer k¯.
We first prove the following inequality:
max
j∈N
E[‖xj,k−τij(k) − x∗j‖] ≤ (C + k)ρmax{0,p−n0} ∀k ∈ [pB1, k¯]. (C.3)
Notice that bk¯/B1c = p. Then by the induction that (41) holds for all k ≤ k¯, we have
max
j∈N
E[‖xj,k − x∗j‖] ≤ (C + k)ρp ∀k ∈ [pB1, k¯]. (C.4)
If B2 = 0, then k − τij(k) = k and n0 = 0 by its definition. Then by (C.4), we obtain the following:
max
j∈N
E[‖xj,k−τij(k) − x∗j‖] = maxj∈N E[‖xj,k − x
∗
j‖] ≤ (C + k)ρp = (C + k)ρmax{0,p−n0} ∀k ∈ [pB1, k¯].
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Thus, (C.3) holds for B2 = 0. If B2 satisfies (n0 − 1)B1 + 1 ≤ B2 ≤ n0B1 for some positive integer n0 ≥ 1 and
k ∈ [pB1, k¯], then by (39), we obtain
max{0, (p− n0)B1} ≤ max{0, k − n0B1} ≤ max{0, k −B2} ≤ k − τij(k) ≤ k a.s.
Then we have the following for all k ∈ [pB1, k¯]:
max
j∈N
E[‖xj,k−τij(k) − x∗j‖] ≤ max
max{0,(p−n0)B1}≤t≤k
max
j∈N
E[‖xj,t − x∗j‖]. (C.5)
We consider the following two possible cases:
i) If max{0, (p− n0)B1} = 0, then by the inductive assumption, we have that for any k ∈ [pB1, k¯]:
max
max{0,(p−n0)B1}≤t≤k
max
j∈N
E[‖xj,t − x∗j‖] = max
0≤t≤k
max
j∈N
E[‖xj,t − x∗j‖]
≤ max
0≤t≤k
(C + t)ρ
b t
B1
c ≤ C + k (since ρ∈(0,1)).
ii) If max{0, (p− n0)B1} = (p− n0)B1, then by the inductive assumption, we have that for any k ∈ [pB1, k¯]:
max
max{0,(p−n0)B1}≤t≤k
max
j∈N
E[‖xj,t − x∗j‖] = max
(p−n0)B1≤t≤k
max
j∈N
E[‖xj,t − x∗j‖]
≤ max
(p−n0)B1≤t≤k
(C + t)ρ
b t
B1
c ≤ (C + k)ρp−n0 (since ρ∈(0,1)).
Combining cases i) and ii), by (C.5), we have the following bound: maxj∈N E[‖xj,k−τij(k) − x∗j‖] ≤ (C +
k)ρmax{0,p−n0} , and hence (C.3) holds for B2 ≥ 1. Consequently, we have shown (C.3).
We will validate that (41) holds for k = k¯ + 1 by considering two cases: k¯ = (p + 1)B1 − 1 or k¯ ∈
[pB1, (p+ 1)B1 − 1) for some nonnegative integer p.
Case 1: k¯ = (p+ 1)B1 − 1. By the inductive assumption, it is seen that (41) holds for any k ∈ [pB1, (p+ 1)B1).
Note that each player updates at least once during any time interval of length B1 by Assumption 4. Then player
i updates its strategy at least p times in the time interval [0, pB1), and there exists at least one integer ki ∈
[pB1, (p + 1)B1) such that i ∈ Iki . Set ki to be the largest integer in the set [pB1, (p + 1)B1) such that i ∈ Iki .
Then βi,ki ≥ p+ 1, hence by (C.2) and (C.3), we derive the following:
E[‖xi,ki+1 − x∗i ‖] ≤ αi,ki + a∞max
j∈N
E[‖xj,ki−τij(ki) − x∗j‖]
≤ ηp+1 + a∞(C + ki)ρmax{p−n0,0}
(
since αi,ki=η
βi,ki and η∈(0,1)
)
≤ ρp+1 + (C + ki)ρp+1 (since 1>ρ≥max{a∞ρ−n0 ,η})
≤ (C + ki + 1)ρp+1.
(C.6)
Therefore, for any i ∈ N , by the selection of ki and the definition of Algorithm 3, we know that
E[‖xi,k+1 − x∗i ‖] = E[‖xi,ki+1 − x∗i ‖] ≤ (C + ki + 1)ρp+1
≤ (C + k + 1)ρp+1 ∀k : ki ≤ k < (p+ 1)B1.
This implies that max
i∈N
E[‖xi,(p+1)B1 − x∗i ‖] ≤ (C + (p + 1)B1)ρp+1, and hence (41) holds for k = k¯ + 1 when
k¯ = (p+ 1)B1 − 1.
Case 2: k¯ ∈ [pB1, (p+ 1)B1 − 1). Since βi,ki ≥ p+ 1 for any i ∈ Ik¯, from (C.2) and (C.3) it follows that
E[‖x̂i,k¯+1 − x∗i ‖] ≤ αi,k¯ + a∞max
j∈N
E[‖xj,k−τij(k¯) − x∗j‖]
≤ ηp+1 + a∞(C + k¯)ρmax{p−n0,0}
(
since αi,k¯=η
βi,k¯ and η∈(0,1)
)
≤ ρp+1 + (C + k¯)ρp+1 (since 1>ρ≥max{a∞ρ−n0 ,η})
≤ (C + k¯ + 1)ρp+1 < (C + k¯ + 1)ρp ∀i ∈ Ik¯.
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For any i /∈ Ik¯, by (C.4), we have E[‖xi,k¯+1 − x∗i ‖] = E[‖xi,k¯ − x∗i ‖] ≤ (C + k¯)ρp < (C + k¯ + 1)ρp , and hence
(41) holds for k = k¯ + 1.
By combing Cases 1 and 2, (41) holds for k = k¯ + 1. Thus, by induction, we obtain (41) for any k ≥ 0.
Since
⌊
k
B1
⌋
≥ kB1 − B1−1B1 and 0 < ρ < 1, by (41) we derive
max
i∈N
E[‖xi,k − x∗i ‖] ≤ (C + k)ρ
k
B1
−B1−1
B1 = ρ
−B1−1
B1 (C + k)ρ
k
B1 = ρ
−B1−1
B1 (C + k)ck, ∀k ≥ 0. (C.7)
From Lemma 2, there exist scalars q andD satisfying q ∈ (c, 1) andD≥1/ ln((q/c)e) such that kck≤Dqk ∀k ≥ 0,
which incorporating with (C.7) and ck < qk yields (42). 2
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